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Amending the Exceptions Clause
Joseph Blocher†
In March 2007, legislators across the country renewed the
long-dormant campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA),1 which would create a constitutional guarantee of equal
treatment on the basis of gender.2 If approved by two-thirds of
both houses of Congress, and ratified by three-fourths of the
states, the ERA (or Women’s Equality Amendment, as it is
sometimes called)3 will become the Twenty-eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.4 And although the ERA faces
long odds,5 it is representative of a much larger wave of
amendment proposals involving such politically and constitu-
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1. Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment,
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2007, at A1.
2. The original Equal Rights Amendment was approved by thirty-five
states—just short of the thirty-eight it needed for ratification. Jim Abrams,
Uphill Fight Forecast for Equal Rights Amendment, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4,
2007, at A4. The text of the Amendment reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
SEC. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
3. Abrams, supra note 2.
4. U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing process for constitutional amendment).
5. See Abrams, supra note 2.
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tionally controversial issues as school prayer, flag burning, and
gay marriage.6
Many of these same issues have recently been the target of
another form of court-centered constitutional politics: jurisdiction-stripping legislation that keeps certain claims (or claimants) out of federal courts, including in some cases the Supreme Court itself. Rather than requiring courts to pronounce
something constitutional, as amendments do, these acts deny
federal courts the power to pronounce on the issue at all. The
effect, in any case, is often the same, since both prevent the
federal courts from declaring unconstitutional acts that they
otherwise might have struck down.
Perhaps the most notable recent jurisdiction-stripping legislation targets claims filed by Guantánamo detainees. In the
past two years, Congress has passed two major pieces of jurisdiction-stripping legislation: the Graham-Levin Amendment to
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)7 and the later and more
sweeping Military Commissions Act (MCA).8 And while Congress’s power to keep Guantánamo detainees’ claims out of the
Supreme Court remains controversial and somewhat unclear,9
6. Alexander K. Hooper, Recent Developments, Jurisdiction Stripping:
The Pledge Protection Act of 2004, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 511, 513 (2005) (“This
surge of court-stripping legislation is the strongest since the early 1980s, when
court decisions upholding school busing programs provoked an equally strong
congressional reaction.”). Of course, this is not the first decade in which scholars have felt besieged by amendment proposals. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1995, at 20.
7. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119
Stat. 2739, 2741–43; see also 151 CONG. REC. S12,752–53 (daily ed. Nov. 15,
2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (presenting the text of the Graham-Levin
Amendment).
8. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). Section 7(a) of
the MCA purports to strip federal courts of all jurisdiction over habeas claims
brought by aliens detained by the United States government whom the government has determined to be enemy combatants or who are awaiting determination of such status. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
9. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2769 (2006) (denying the
government’s motion to dismiss), the Supreme Court considered and rejected
an argument that the Graham-Levin Amendment stripped it of jurisdiction
over Hamdan’s then-pending case. Because the Court found that the GrahamLevin Amendment did not apply to pending cases, it did not address the
Amendment’s constitutionality. Id. at 2763–64, 2769 n.15.
In February 2007, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the MCA denied all federal jurisdiction
over pending habeas cases filed by aliens held at Guantánamo. Boumediene v.
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007),
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the Guantánamo bills are not the only recent examples of legislation designed to “zone” congressionally disfavored legal
claims out of the federal courts.10 Other proposals, many of
which attracted widespread support, would have eliminated diversity jurisdiction,11 jurisdiction over cases involving school
desegregation,12 abortion,13 or, as discussed in more detail below, public prayer.14 Although the exact boundary of Congress’s
jurisdiction-stripping power is murky, making it a continuing
source of grist for academic mills,15 it is clear that Congress re-

cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007). The Supreme Court refused to hear an
expedited appeal from the D.C. Circuit’s decision, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S.
Ct. 1478 (2007), but Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg published a dissent
from denial of certiorari, id. at 1479 (Souter, Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting), and Justices Stevens and Kennedy published a joint statement pointedly
indicating their willingness to review future claims “[w]ere the Government to
take additional steps to prejudice the position of petitioners seeking review in
this Court,” id. at 1478 (statement of Stevens & Kennedy, JJ.). In June 2007,
the Court reversed course and mustered the necessary five votes in favor of
oral argument. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (granting certiorari). The case was heard on December 5, 2007. Supreme Court Revisits Habeas
Rights of Guantánamo Enemy Combatant Detainees, 76 U.S.L.W. 3297 (2007).
10. See Laurence H. Tribe, Commentary, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering:
Zoning Disfavored Rights out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
129 (1981) (discussing eighteen proposals to reduce the jurisdiction of federal
courts).
11. See, e.g., H.R. 9622, 95th Cong. (1978) (abolishing diversity jurisdiction except for alienage and statutory interpleader); S. 2389, 95th Cong.
(1978); S. REP. NO. 691, 71st Cong, 2d Sess. (1930). To modern lawyers, the
elimination of federal diversity jurisdiction may seem radical, but many eminent scholars and judges have supported the idea over the years. E.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to the “mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial
system by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction”); Nat’l Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650–51 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
12. See generally Chip Jones, Comment, Freeman v. Pitts: Congress Can
(and Should?) Limit Federal Court Jurisdiction in School Desegregation Cases,
47 SMU L. REV. 1889 (1994); Constance W. Watson, Comment, The HelmsJohnston Amendment: A Congressional Effort to Curb the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and to Restrict Busing as a Remedy in School Desegregation Cases,
26 HOW. L.J. 1661 (1983).
13. S. 210, 98th Cong. (1983) (stripping lower federal court jurisdiction
over abortion cases). The Ninety-seventh Congress proposed similar bills. See
H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. § 4 (1981); S. 158, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981).
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part II.B for a partial review of the rich literature. For more
current discussion, see Conference, Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference
on the State of the Judiciary, 95 GEO. L.J. 895 (2007).
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tains broad power under Article III’s Exceptions Clause16 to
keep certain claims out of federal court.17
These two forms of constitutional politicking18—
amendment and jurisdiction stripping—are on a colossal collision course, one that threatens to transform processes of “higher” constitutional- and court-centered politics into tools for everyday legislative battles.19 Indeed, constitutional amendment
and jurisdiction-stripping legislation already have more in
common than constitutional and federal courts scholars seem to

16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (describing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction “both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make”).
17. This does not mean, of course, that such claims cannot be heard, only
that federal courts cannot hear them. State court judges also swear to uphold
federal law and have concurrent jurisdiction to consider federal law claims.
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341–44, 346 (1816).
18. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, A Constitution We Are Amending:
In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 436 (1983) (referring to amendment as “constitutional politics as opposed to constitutional
law”). I do not mean here to invoke the same kind of “higher lawmaking”
Bruce Ackerman describes as involving “Publian appeals to the common good,
ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens expressing their assent
through extraordinary institutional forms.” Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution] (footnotes omitted); see also
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE] (discussing “higher lawmaking”); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989)
[hereinafter Ackerman, Constitutional Politics].
19. Writing in 1984, Ackerman noted that, “[t]hough no permanent damage has yet been done, the law of constitutional amendment has increasingly
been dominated by short-term considerations of factional advantage rather
than a long-run sense of constitutional development.” Ackerman, Discovering
the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1065. The same might easily be said of jurisdiction-stripping proposals. See Laura N. Fellow, Note, Congressional Striptease: How the Failures of the 108th Congress’s Jurisdiction-Stripping Bills
Were Used for Political Success, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1121 passim
(2006) (explaining the political benefits to legislators of supporting such proposals).
To borrow and alter slightly Ackerman’s conception of a dualist democracy—which separates “constitutional” from “normal” politics, Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 461–62—this trend suggests that the distinction between the two tiers of politics is collapsing, or at least that means of
politics traditionally associated with the former are now becoming common
currency for the latter. I say “alter” because Ackerman is not particularly concerned with these characterization-of-process questions. Constitutional politics, in his conception, can and usually do occur without regard to Article V.
See id. at 509–15 (noting examples of higher lawmaking in ways that supplement the process of Article V).
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realize.20 Both are legislative attempts to undo or avoid court
decisions, and both generally find support in a reclaiming-theConstitution-from-the-courts rhetoric. Even the targeted subject matters are similar: flag burning,21 gay marriage,22 and
school prayer,23 for example, have been the subject of both
amendment and jurisdiction-stripping proposals in recent
years. And despite spotty success records,24 politicians increasingly utilize both of these procedures to advance substantive
political issues, particularly in areas such as school prayer,
where courts might otherwise declare politically popular legislation unconstitutional.

20. One scholar who has devoted sustained attention to both areas is Akhil Amar, whose work has addressed both constitutional amendment, see, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited], and federal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist
View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 205 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, The TwoTiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990).
21. Following the Supreme Court’s rulings in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), the Senate
came within three votes of approving an amendment that would have criminalized desecration of an American flag. Robin Toner, Flag-Burning Amendment
Fails in Senate, but Margin Narrows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at A1. Similar amendments have been proposed since, and last year came within a single
vote of Senate approval. Carl Hulse, Flag Amendment Narrowly Fails in Senate Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at A1. Those who believe that an
amendment would be “overkill” have suggested that jurisdiction-stripping
measures might suffice instead. Ramesh Ponnuru, One Branch Among Three,
NAT’L REV., July 29, 2002, at 32.
22. In the aftermath of the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s ruling in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), multiple amendments defining marriage as existing only between a man and a
woman were proposed in both houses of Congress. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 106,
108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong.
(2004). These amendments failed in both the House and Senate, but were
quickly followed with the Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong.
(2004), which would have severely curtailed federal jurisdiction. For a helpful
chronology of events, see Fellow, supra note 19, at 1154–56.
23. Amendments protecting school prayer have been proposed many
times, though few have gained much currency. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 11, 110th
Cong. (2007). Jurisdiction-stripping proposals have been proposed just as frequently. See infra notes 170–78 and accompanying text.
24. More than 10,000 amendment proposals have been brought before
Congress. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution:
An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 111, 112 (1993). Jurisdiction-stripping legislation has fared little better. Fellow, supra note 19, at 1123 (noting the “eternal failure” of such bills).
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Constitutional amendment and jurisdiction stripping, however, operate under something of an uneasy truce. The proposed ERA provides a brief but illustrative hypothetical of how
the two processes interact, rather than simply proceeding on
parallel tracks. If proposed and ratified, the ERA would subject
gender discrimination to strict scrutiny, the same “strict in
theory and fatal in fact”25 level of review that federal and state
courts commonly apply to invalidate racially discriminatory
acts under the Equal Protection Clause.26 But like all constitutional-rights guarantees, the ERA would rely heavily on the
federal courts to give it meaning and enforce its protections.
What if a future Congress, unhappy with the ERA but unable
to muster the votes necessary to re-amend the Constitution and
excise it,27 were instead to pass a law stripping federal courts of
jurisdiction over ERA claims?28 Petitioners bringing ERA challenges would not be zoned out of court entirely, since state
courts would remain responsible for enforcing the amendment.
25. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978) (striking down a race-based medical
school admissions program); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
27. Only once has the U.S. Constitution been explicitly amended to remove another amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.”); see also id. amend. XVIII (prohibiting the “manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors” within the United States and its jurisdiction); Richard F. Hamm, Short Euphorias Followed by Long Hangovers: Unintended Consequences of the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments, in
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 164, 182 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000).
28. See Christopher T. Handman, Note, The Doctrine of Political Accountability and Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Applying a New External Constraint
to Congress’s Exceptions Clause Power, 106 YALE L.J. 197, 199 (1996) (noting
that jurisdiction stripping may be a second-best alternative for legislators who
are unable to muster support for a revising amendment).
A 2004 Republican Policy Committee paper endorsed jurisdiction stripping as a better “check” on the judiciary than impeachment or amendment:
The best check available to the people is for their representatives to
eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts over particular issues.
The alternatives are too cumbersome for all but the most fundamental matters. For example, it is very difficult to remove judges from office, and the constitutional amendment process is inadequate to address all ill-advised judicial pronouncements.
U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., The Case for Jurisdiction-Stripping
Legislation: Restoring Popular Control of the Constitution 4 (Sept. 28, 2004),
available at http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Sept2804CourtStrippingSD.pdf.
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But like the Guantánamo detainees, ERA claimants would find
themselves facing sharply limited forum choices and potentially
hostile judges.29 A jurisdiction-stripping bill could thus effectively re-amend the post-ERA Constitution, at least in part.
But can Congress really use the Exceptions Clause to effectively re-amend the Constitution by stripping federal jurisdiction over amendment-based claims?30 This Article argues that
it cannot, at least not always. In fact, Congress’s power to strip
federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims is more limited
than commonly supposed because the Exceptions Clause can
be—and may already have been—limited through subsequent
amendment. Some version of this argument has already won
widespread support in the academy. Ever since Lawrence Sager’s 1981 Harvard Law Review Foreword,31 federal courts scholars have increasingly embraced the idea that the rest of the
Constitution places “external constraints” on the Exceptions
Clause. Under this theory, Congress cannot strip federal jurisdiction in ways that would violate certain amendments, or per29. Many jurisdiction-stripping proposals are premised on the belief that
state courts will find a way around Supreme Court precedent, or else will
simply ignore it, knowing that their decisions cannot be overturned by the
Court. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman & Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper
Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 505
(1983); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court
Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External
Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 926 (1982); Charles E. Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress
Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190, 197 (1981); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 68 (1981).
Indeed, it seems almost inevitable that some state courts would ignore
federal mandates in hotly contested areas of law, such as those typically targeted by current amendment and jurisdiction-stripping proposals. Public
prayer—the target of both constitutional amendments and a jurisdictionstripping proposal considered in Part II.C—is only the most prominent example. See also Todd Kleffman, Moore Won’t Move Display, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER (Ala.), Aug. 15, 2003, at A1, available at http://www
.montgomeryadvertiser.com/specialreports/TENcommandments/
StoryAlabamamoore15w.htm (reporting Alabama Supreme Court Justice
Moore’s defiance of a federal court order to remove a monument of the Ten
Commandments).
30. The Supreme Court has been wary of congressional attempts to
“amend” the Constitution outside of Article V. See, e.g., City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (overturning the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and stating that upholding the Act would mean that “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the
difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V”).
31. Sager, supra note 29.
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haps even provisions of the original Constitution.32 How exactly
these external constraints function, and to what degree they
limit legislative power, largely remain open and difficult questions.
But there is another predicate question that external constraints theorists must answer: how do constitutional amendments revise preexisting constitutional provisions like the Exceptions Clause, and why should we read amendments as
imposing constraints on the clear language of the Clause when
not a single amendment—nor any other provision in the Constitution—even mentions it? This Article attempts to answer
those questions by advancing a thicker understanding of the
amendment process and a more nuanced understanding of the
Exceptions Clause itself. If successful, this effort should partially relieve two of legal academia’s central obsessions—
defining the impact of constitutional amendments and establishing limits on Congress’s power to strip federal jurisdiction—
by showing how the two shed light on one another.
Part I of the Article begins that project by elaborating the
implicit but undertheorized point that constitutional amendments can, and usually do, trump provisions of the original
constitutional text, even though they rarely identify the specific
sections of the Constitution that they alter. The argument in
this Part draws on evidence from the text and structure of the
Constitution and from current constitutional theory. But while
many scholars have addressed the foundational problems relating to how constitutional amendments come about33 or what
specific amendments say,34 few have explored the relationship
32. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895,
900 (1984) (arguing that congressional power over federal jurisdiction is subject to limitations “inferable from other provisions of the Constitution”).
33. The depth of the literature makes even a cursory sampling nearly impossible. For some of the most recent and provocative thinking on the subject
of the process of constitutional amendment, see Ackerman, Discovering the
Constitution, supra note 18, at 1051–57; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra
note 20; Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 387 (1983); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the
Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993).
Discussion of the “convention method” of constitutional amendment—
which I will discuss in even less detail, because it has never been successfully
pursued—has spawned an almost embarrassing richness of scholarship. See
infra note 52.
34. Space constraints prevent even a partial listing of the scholarship addressing the content of particular amendments. Suffice it to say, entire aca-
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between constitutional amendments and specific provisions of
the Constitution’s original text. Part I concludes by drawing on
existing theory to suggest how courts and scholars can better
understand this relationship.
Part II of the Article applies Part I’s theory to the legendarily intractable problem of the “limited” Exceptions Clause.
Theories of the Clause’s limits tend to fall into two major categories. The first explains the Clause’s limitations by pointing to
“internal” constraints that are inherent to Article III and the
“essential functions” of the judiciary in our constitutional system. The second includes “external” constraints imposed on the
Clause by the rest of the Constitution, particularly the amendments. Although external constraints theories have gained increasing currency,35 they remain hampered by a relatively thin
understanding of exactly how those constraints interact with
the Exceptions Clause itself. The amendment theory described
in Part I, which concludes that amendments implicitly alter rather than add to the Constitution, provides a new justification
for the external constraints theory. In doing so, it places the external constraints theory on stronger footing by giving textual,
logical, and historical support to the argument that constitutional provisions—including the Exceptions Clause—can be
implicitly amended.36
I. THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
This Part provides the basis for a more robust external
constraints theory by analyzing the impact of constitutional
amendments on the original Constitution. Drawing from the
text and history of the Constitution, as well as from constitutional scholarship, it revisits the interpretive relationship between the amendments and the provisions of the original document. The discussion here demonstrates that the
amendments’ placement at the end of the Constitution—an undertheorized but important part of the constitutional story—

demic careers (not to mention thousands of reported federal decisions) have
been spent unpacking the meaning of a handful of words from the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
35. See, e.g., Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1365, 1379–81 (2007) (arguing that jurisdiction-stripping proposals should be
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equality).
36. See Tribe, supra note 18, at 445 (“In short, remembering that it is an
amendment to the Constitution we are considering may be almost as important as remembering that it is a Constitution we are, in the end, amending.”).
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makes their impact on certain constitutional provisions harder
to identify, though no less important.
A. AMENDMENTS ARE NOT ADDITIONS: PUTTING THE “AMEND”
INTO CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Constitutional amendments can, and generally do, change
provisions of the original Constitution without ever specifically
identifying which part of its text they mean to change. Establishing the impact of an amendment thus requires an interpretive synthesis between the amendment and the document it
amends, in order to determine what has and has not been
changed.
This of course does not mean that amendments automatically and unavoidably “trump” the language of the original
Constitution.37 Alex Kozinski and Eugene Volokh have rightly
pointed out that a presumption that later-in-time amendments
radically change the meaning of all prior provisions could lead
to absurd results.38 But while amendments may not always
change everything that comes before them,39 they are—by virtue of their placement, timing, and intended impact—
necessarily on different footing from the rest of the Constitution. They were passed to alter or add something—to “amend”
or improve the original document. Sometimes it is clear what
defect or omission an amendment means to correct, even when
the amendment does not specifically identify its target. For ex37. Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments:
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 157 n.180 (1992) (arguing
that neither of two different-in-time amendments “‘trumps’ the other; rather
they must be synthesized into a coherent doctrinal whole”).
38. Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Commentary, A Penumbra Too Far,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1650 (1993) (“[W]hile the chronology might mean the
Thirteenth Amendment could alter the First, this doesn’t mean it does alter it.
The notion that every constitutional amendment is a partial repeal of every
previously-enacted constitutional provision has hair-raising implications. Does
the Sixteenth Amendment, which grants Congress the power to ‘lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,’ authorize a tax levied only
on income derived from sale of antigovernment literature, or a tax only on
blacks? Does it allow collection techniques that violate the Fourth Amendment? Does the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause authorize ex
post facto laws, or the suspension of habeas corpus? ” (footnotes omitted)).
39. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005) (expressing the
“framers’ clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause”); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (finding that “the Twenty-first Amendment
does not pro tanto repeal the Commerce Clause” and that “the relevance of the
Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional provisions becomes increasingly doubtful”).
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ample, the Seventeenth Amendment nowhere mentions Article
I, yet it clearly amends Section 3 of Article I by providing for
direct election of senators rather than their election or appointment by a state legislature.40 Usually, however, amendments do not make it so clear what part of the original Constitution they address, and it is up to interpreters of the
Constitution to divine their impact. For example, the Supreme
Court has implied that Congress’s power to grant copyright
protections—a power specifically listed in Article I41—may be
limited by the First Amendment,42 despite the fact that nothing
in the First Amendment specifically declares its intention to
change the Copyright Clause.43 Nor have constitutional scholars seen any reason to busy themselves demonstrating that
the drafters of the First Amendment had the Copyright Clause
or any other specific provision of the original Constitution in
mind when they proposed the Amendment.44 It is simply understood that the First Amendment limits the enumerated
powers that Article I gives to Congress.45 The example may
40. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing that senators shall “be
elected by the people” of each state), with id. art. I, § 3 (stating that the Senate
was to be “chosen by the Legislature” of each state).
41. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
42. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (suggesting that copyright statutes may raise First Amendment problems if they lack “built-in free
speech safeguards”).
43. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I (failing to refer to the Copyright Clause).
44. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877, 907 (1996) (“‘Congress’ in the First Amendment is taken,
without controversy, to mean the entire federal government, even though
elsewhere ‘Congress’ certainly does not include the courts or the President.”).
Those who are already familiar with the jurisdiction-stripping literature,
which I discuss below in Part II.B, may note that these arguments have much
in common with the “external constraints” approach. See infra notes 191–212
and accompanying text.
45. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 96
(1961) (“[C]ongressional power in this sphere, as in all spheres, is limited by
the First Amendment.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 106 n.2 (1958) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (noting that the First Amendment “of course would have the
effect in appropriate cases of limiting congressional power otherwise possessed”); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589
(1935) (“The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers of
Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment.”).
Adrian Vermeule and Ernest Young argue that “there is little reason to
think that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers and ratifiers had any special
insight into the Fifth Amendment’s original meaning. It is an empirical question whether the framers of later provisions are skilled interpreters of the
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seem simplistic, but it illustrates the generally unexamined
proposition that constitutional amendments often trump “original” constitutional text even when they do not specifically refer
to the text they alter.46 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
“the Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress
or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these
granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they
may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.”47
Understanding that amendments often have an unstated
impact does not, of course, commit courts and scholars to any
particular understanding of an individual amendment’s content
or reach. An amendment might broadly alter the text of the
original Constitution, or it might do so narrowly, or it might in
some limited cases be more of an addition than a true amendment.48 In the First Amendment context, for example, one does
not have to agree with Justice Hugo Black’s famously absolutist reading49 to believe that whatever limits the First Amendoriginal meaning of earlier provisions . . . .” Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A.
Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 765 (2000). Kurt Lash’s recent historical
analysis of the Ninth Amendment, by contrast, suggests that the drafters of
later-in-time amendments did consider (and alter) the content of prior
amendments. Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 6–7, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953008) (arguing that the
Ninth Amendment’s reference to “‘certain rights’ enumerated in the Constitution” includes, at a minimum, “the rights ‘numbered’ or listed in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution”); see also id. (manuscript at 23) (“Also, even
if the Ninth was originally understood as a guardian of local autonomy, later
amendments substantially altered the original federalist structure of the
Ninth Amendment.”).
46. The same is true of the relationship between different-in-time
amendments. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies
. . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
47. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (striking down Ohio election laws on equal protection grounds).
48. See infra Part I.C.
49. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960)
(“The phrase ‘Congress shall make no law’ is composed of plain words, easily
understood. . . . Neither as offered nor as adopted is the language of this
amendment anything less than absolute.”). The Supreme Court has rejected
Justice Black’s absolutist position in a variety of cases, see, e.g., Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 44 (1961), and various scholars have debated the merits of his approach as opposed to a “balancing” or “categorization” test. See,
e.g., John H. Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
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ment imposes, it imposes on Congress. Similarly, whether the
First Amendment covers obscene speech is an entirely separate
question from whether that coverage limits congressional power under Article I.50 Nor does the potential of amendments to
change what comes before them mean that there is no limit on
what an amendment can achieve.51 Just as a self-described
amendment can occasionally be nothing more than an addition—an issue explored in greater detail in Part I.C—it is possible that a particularly radical amendment (whether passed by
the convention method52 or the legislative proposal method)
1482 (1975); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912–16 (1963) (discussing “ad hoc balancing”
and “absolute” tests); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440–45 (1962) (analyzing seven objections to the balancing approach).
50. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in
Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270, 276 (1981) (differentiating between
cases “covered” by the First Amendment and those cases “protected” thereunder, with the former referring to whether a certain speech act receives constitutional protection at all and the latter referring to the level of protection it
receives).
51. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 703, 754–57 (1980); Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil
Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 22 (1987);
Walter F. Murphy, The Right to Privacy and Legitimate Constitutional
Change, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
THE UNITED STATES 213, 227 (Shlomo Slonim ed., 1990); cf. Thomas M. Cooley,
The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 MICH. L.J. 109, 118 (1893)
(“Now an amendment . . . must be in harmony with the thing amended . . . . It
must not be something so entirely incongruous that, instead of amending or
reforming it, it overthrows or revolutionizes it.”); John R. Vile, The Case
Against Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 191, 213 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION] (arguing that the Constitution’s implicit
limits on Article V “wisely protect[ ] liberty by guarding against the transient
whims of the majority”). Donald Lutz has also considered the possibility of
amendment as “periodic replacement of the entire document.” Donald S. Lutz,
Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION, supra, at 237, 237.
52. For highlights of the debate regarding the constitutional convention
method, see generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189 (1972) [hereinafter Black, A Letter to a
Congressman]; Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A
Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957 (1963) [hereinafter Black, The Proposed
Amendment of Article V]; Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the
“Limited” Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979); Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA.
L. REV. 1 (1979); and William W. Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict the
States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?—A Letter to a Colleague, 1978
DUKE L.J. 1295. For a discussion of the constitutional convention method, see
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might better be classified as a constitutional revision,53 or the
creation of an entirely new constitution.54
Even this brief explanation of the impact of amendments
would be superfluous if amendments specifically identified the
constitutional text they were meant to alter. Amendments have
such potentially variant scope and reach primarily because
they do not identify the provisions they alter, as do other legal
changes. Statutory amendments, for example, tend to clearly
identify, strike out and replace particular provisions.55 Contracts and other “practical” legal documents also generally
make amendments and changes to the text itself.56 It is indeed
difficult to imagine it any other way. But whether through historical accident or constitutional design,57 amendments to the
U.S. Constitution are not interwoven with the text, but rather
appended to the end, leaving it to later generations to determine what the drafters of the amendments intended to amend.
Naturally, the need to identify amendments’ impact on the
preexisting Constitution increases the demands on constitutional interpretation. Judges considering an amendment-based
case must not only determine what the amendment enables or
prohibits (What does it mean to pass no law “respecting an EsLaurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627,
628–30 (1979).
53. Sanford Levinson notes that some state constitutions differentiate between “amendment” and “revision” and prescribe different procedures for the
two. Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution
Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional
Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 13, 19 (citing
Gene R. Nichol, Constitutional Judgment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1118 (1993)).
54. See Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra
note 51, at 163, 176–77 (distinguishing between amending, revising, and
transforming a constitution).
55. Interestingly, “amendments” to bills do not serve a strike-out function,
at least not always. They are often attached as “riders” that do not “amend,”
nor necessarily even relate to, the subject mater of the bill itself. See Commonwealth v. Burnett, 48 A. 976, 977 (Pa. 1901) (describing a rider as a “new
and unrelated enactment or provision”); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject
Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 842–43 (2006) (explaining the process by which committee members attach riders).
56. Cf. House v. McMullen, 100 P. 344, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1909) (“The particulars wherein it was sought to revise the written agreement are, as stated
by respondent: ‘First, to substitute the word ‘exchange’ for the word ‘sell’;
second, to insert a more particular description of the real property which is the
subject matter of the contract; third, to strike out a certain term in the contract; and, fourth, to insert a certain other term in the contract.’”).
57. See infra Part II.B.
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tablishment of Religion”?) but also what part of the Constitution the amendment addresses (Who is not allowed to pass such
laws?). This is akin to determining what presumed defect the
amendment corrects. Drafters of the First Amendment, for example, probably targeted Article I, Sections 8 and 9 (the sections listing grants and limits on congressional power)58 which,
it turns out, is where Madison originally proposed the amendment’s placement.59 The following Section considers in more detail the decisions the Founders made with regard to placement,
and what impact that placement has on the meaning of the
amendments.
B. EVIDENCE FROM THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Textual and historical evidence from the Founding Era
both support an understanding of amendments as changes rather than additions to the Constitution. The text of Article V
and the preamble to the amendments demonstrate the framers’
belief that, in amending the Constitution, subsequent generations would essentially be re-creating the document. Further
illustrating the framers’ belief in the power of the amendments,
some expressed concern that placing the amendments at the
end would render their impact uncertain, and thus possibly
more sweeping.
1. The Constitution’s Text
While the Constitution provides for its own amendment, it
says nothing explicit about how amendments interact with its
provisions. But a close reading of the Constitution’s text supports the theory laid out in the previous Section—amendments
do not simply add to the Constitution, but actually change what
came before them, despite the fact that few amendments actually identify the text they mean to alter.
The natural place to begin—and, for some, the place to
end60—is with the text of Article V. By providing for peaceful,
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8–9.
59. See infra notes 100–10 and accompanying text for a retelling of the
framers’ brief discussion about whether the amendments should be interwoven with the Constitution’s text or appended to the end.
60. For arguments that Article V is the only way in which the Constitution may be amended, see generally David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 117; David R.
Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Dow, The Case of Article V]; and John R.
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democratic alteration of the Constitution, Article V effectively
codifies the constitutional revolution that produced the Constitution in the first place. Although his own theory of constitutional amendment emphatically disclaims reliance on Article V,
Bruce Ackerman has proclaimed that
Article V is the most fundamental text of our Constitution, since it
seeks to tell us the conditions under which all other constitutional
texts and principles may be legitimately transformed. Rather than
treating it as a part of the Constitution’s code of good housekeeping,
we should accord the text of Article V the kind of elaborate reflection
we presently devote to the First and Fourteenth Amendments.61

Article V reads in full:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided
that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in
the Senate.62

Vile, Legally Amending the United States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article V’s Mechanics, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 271 (1991).
For arguments to the contrary, see Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 18; Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 18; Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 20; and Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 89. I limit the discussion here to amendments which have been
passed through Article V’s enumerated processes. I thus do not consider here
the impact, if any, of “amendments” occurring outside the confines of Article V.
My initial sense is that the general framework I have advanced should translate without much problem to any kind of amendment, no matter the process
by which it was approved.
I also have not addressed the impact on my Exceptions Clause analysis of
what many have referred to as “judicial amendments.” See, e.g., JOHN R. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS,
AND LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTIONS 35–55 (1994) (considering Supreme Court decisions and their impact on constitutional change). Again, the
analysis would be the same.
61. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1058; see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561,
1563 (1998) (reviewing DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS:
AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1776–1995 (1996)) (“The amendment
process is thus not peripheral to the constitution, but is its essence.”).
62. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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By its terms, Article V thus enumerates only two limitations on its own scope63—one relating to slavery, and another
regarding state representation in the Senate. It also lists only
two procedures by which amendments can be proposed and ratified. The first option is a legislative proposal approved by twothirds of both houses of Congress and then ratified by threefourths of the states.64 The alternative is a proposal resulting
from a “Convention” convened by Congress “on the Application
of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,” and
whose proposals shall become amendments following approval
by three-fourths of the states.65
The most striking thing about these two methods is how
closely they track the process for ratifying the original Constitution. Considering that amendments effectively change the
original Constitution, it is unsurprising that provisions for
amendment underwent “significant adjustments” as the ratification procedure evolved.66 Under either method of constitutional amendment, the approval required—“ratifi[cation] by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof”67—is essentially identical to
the vote requirement for ratification of the Constitution—nine
of the thirteen states. This nine-of-thirteen requirement is the
nearest possible approximation of three-fourths of the thenexisting states to which the Constitution was presented for ratification.68 And although the convention method of constitutional amendment has never been successfully invoked, it too
echoes the conditions under which the Constitution was

63. See also infra notes 290–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Civil War-era Corwin Amendment, which would have explicitly amended
Article V by further limiting states’ power to abolish slavery.
64. U.S. CONST. art. V.
65. Id.
66. David E. Kyvig, Arranging for Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of
Constitutional Design, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 9, 18.
67. U.S. CONST. art. V.
68. Although nine-thirteenths is actually slightly less than three-fourths,
Kyvig notes that the number nine was chosen through a “process of groping
toward compromise,” and that Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, and Maryland supported a ten-of-thirteen requirement. Kyvig, supra note 66, at 21. Incidentally, three-fourths is almost precisely the fraction of the framers who
signed the original document in Philadelphia. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal,
Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 514 (1995) (noting that
thirty-nine of the fifty-five delegates—seventy-one percent—signed the convention’s final proposal).

988

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:971

created.69 By reproducing the requirements for constitutional
creation, Article V lends structural, inferential reinforcement to
the idea that constitutional amendments have the power to
change the original document rather than simply adding to it.
In maintaining a high bar for changes to the Constitution, the
framers recognized that, by passing constitutional amendments, later generations would essentially engage in a process
of constitutional re-creation analogous to their own process of
constitutional design.70
Of course, one might reasonably object that the similarities
between the requirements for the Constitution’s creation and
the requirements for the amendments’ creation simply reflect
the fact that amendments are additions to the Constitution, not
that they change what has come before them. Under this approach, interpreters should read amendments alongside, not on
top of, prior constitutional provisions, unless they specifically
and clearly identify the text they mean to alter. Another woefully underappreciated part of the Constitution’s text—the
Preamble to the Amendments—further clarifies this point.
69. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1059 (“[T]he
Article V procedure for calling a ‘Convention’ is obviously modeled upon the
process by which the 1787 Convention was called into being.”); see also Black,
The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 52, at 963 (suggesting that
the Founders were thinking of the Philadelphia Convention when they created
the “convention” method of amendment).
70. As George Washington himself would write a few months later,
the People (for it is with them to Judge) can as they will have the advantage of experience on their Side, decide with as much propriety on
the alterations and amendments which are necessary . . . . I do not
think we are more inspired, have more wisdom, or possess more virtue, than those who will come after us.
Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 10, 1878), in
THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 81,
83 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986).
In The Federalist No. 85, however, Hamilton argued that in practical
terms amendments would be easier to ratify than the original Constitution:
[E]very amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be
a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There
would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any other point, no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite
number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently whenever nine or rather 10 states, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take
place. There can therefore be no comparison between the facility of effecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a
complete constitution.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 592 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (footnote omitted).
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For all the importance that scholars have placed on the
words “We the People” in the Preamble to the Constitution,71
little if any attention has been paid to the words—or even the
existence—of the Preamble to the Amendments.72 But like the
Constitution’s Preamble, which many scholars have used to illuminate the meaning of the Constitution, the introduction to
the Amendments may cast light on their meaning and their relationship to the rest of the Constitution. In full, the Preamble
to the Amendments reads: “Articles in Addition To, and
Amendment of, the Constitution of the United States of America, Proposed by Congress, and Ratified by the Legislatures of
the Several States, Pursuant to the Fifth Article of the Original
Constitution.”73
Several phrases here are worthy of close examination.
First, the word “Articles” echoes the headers separating the
seven major sections—“Articles”—in the original Constitution.74 This suggests that the framers saw amendments as being at least as important as the Articles of the Constitution itself.
The phrases immediately following “Articles” help clarify
the relationship of these new “Articles”—the amendments—to
the original text: they are “in Addition To, and Amendment of,
the Constitution of the United States of America.”75 The word
“and” and the commas setting off the second phrase do a lot of
work here. Together they suggest the existence of two kinds of
amendments: those that “add” to the Constitution and those
that “amend” it.
The next two phrases in the Amendments’ Preamble—
“Proposed by Congress, and Ratified by the Legislatures of the
Several States”—echo Article V’s ratification requirements, invoking both the congressional proposal and state ratification

71. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 18; see also U.S.
CONST. pmbl.
72. A LexisNexis search conducted on March 22, 2008 in the “US Law Reviews and Journals, Combined” database for the phrase “Articles in Addition
To, and Amendment of ”—the second Preamble’s equivalent of the first’s “We
the People”—turns up only thirteen hits, most of them in articles that simply
reproduce the Constitution in its entirety. A search for “We the People,” unsurprisingly, results in more hits than LexisNexis is able to report (at least
3000).
73. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X pmbl.
74. See id. arts. I–VII.
75. Id. amends. I–X pmbl.
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procedures.76 As described above, those procedures in turn
mimic the procedures for ratification of the Constitution itself,
lending support to the notion that amendments have the power
to change the Constitution.77 Finally, the Preamble’s reference
to the “Original” Constitution indicates that there is a document other than the preamendment Constitution—that the
Constitution itself changes and becomes a “new” constitution
when it is amended.78
Even acknowledging that the Constitution itself changes,
several interpretations of an amendment’s effect remain possible. One is to simply say that the Constitution becomes longer
and more elaborate through the amendment process. This is
the “Addition” reading. But another is to say that every time
the document is amended, a new Constitution emerges, one
whose provisions have been altered in light of subsequent
amendments which must be synthesized with the original
text.79 This is the “Amendment” reading, and, in analyzing the
impact of most amendments, it is the better one, as the following Sections demonstrate.
2. Historical Evidence Surrounding Article V and the
Amendments
In addition to this textual support for the Amendment
reading, at least two kinds of constitutional history support the
notion that amendments can and do implicitly change the
meaning of the original Constitution: the Founders’ (few)
statements regarding Article V, and the historical record of the
early constitutional amendments.80
In a very real sense, the need for amendment is what gave
birth to the Constitution.81 In addition to their notorious subs76. Id.; see id. art. V.
77. See supra notes 66–69.
78. See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1873) (describing the original Constitution and its first twelve amendments as being
“historical and of another age” since “three other articles of amendment of vast
importance have been added by the voice of the people to that now venerable
instrument”).
79. Ackerman describes this as “multigenerational synthesis.” Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 517; see also Bruce Ackerman, The
Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1793–1809 (2007) [hereinafter
Ackerman, The Living Constitution] (describing the “Conversation Between
Generations”).
80. Limitations on space prevent full consideration of all the amendments,
but of course the thesis presented here would benefit from such discussion.
81. Some have argued that amendments are necessary for the very legi-
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tantive weaknesses—such as the lack of a federal taxing power82—the Articles of Confederation were also structurally brittle and inflexible. They could be amended only by unanimous
consent of all the states, making reform all but impossible.83
David Kyvig, perhaps the leading scholar of Article V and the
history of constitutional amendment, writes, “The requirement
of unanimous state agreement to congressionally initiated proposals to amend the Articles of Confederation was, from the
outset, the defining characteristic of the first government of the
United States.”84 The framers were thus forced to “amend” an
unamendable document.85 As Kyvig puts it, “It is reasonable to
argue, in fact, that the 1787 Constitution was both the first and
the greatest act of U.S. constitutional amendment.”86
But despite the importance of amendment to the existence
and evolution of the Constitution, the constitutional history of
Article V is notoriously sparse.87 Early in the Philadelphia
Convention, the delegates approved—without much discussion88—the Virginia Plan, which determined that a “provision
timacy of the Constitution. Dellinger, supra note 33, at 387 (“An unamendable
constitution, adopted by a generation long since dead, could hardly be viewed
as a manifestation of the consent of the governed.”).
82. Erwin Chemerinksy, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV.
89, 90 (2001) (“Under the Articles of Confederation, the limited federal government had no taxing power and therefore no revenue to spend.”).
83. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
906, 926 n.40 (1988) (“A fair reading of the Articles of Confederation made it
clear that they could be abrogated only by the unanimous consent of all the
states.”).
84. DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 37 (1996).
85. Kyvig points out that “the drafters of the 1787 Constitution acknowledged its revisionary character as they declared it an attempt to ‘form a more
perfect union.’” Id. at 42.
86. Kyvig, supra note 66, at 18.
87. Dow, The Case of Article V, supra note 60, at 41 (“As was the case with
the Federalist Papers, the issue of the article V amendment process received
relatively little attention at the convention.”); see also id. at 41 n.202 (listing
“the entirety of references in the records of the Constitutional Convention to
the amendment process”).
88. The only significant discussion was an oft-repeated statement from
George Mason:
The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be
necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence. It
would be improper to require the consent of the Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that
very account. The opportunity for such abuse, may be the fault of the
Constitution calling for amendmt [sic].
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ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union
whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the
National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.”89 Specific discussion of the mechanism for amendment, however, was
left for the final week of the four-month Philadelphia Convention. During that period the delegates proposed a second method of constitutional amendment.90 Not only would the national legislature have to call a convention for amendment on
application of two-thirds of the states’ legislatures; it could also
act on its own and propose amendments to the states for approval.91 The only remaining debate was what level of state approval would be required to ratify these legislative proposals.92
By a vote of six states to five, the delegates rejected a twothirds majority, and instead approved a proposal raising the
standard to three-fourths.93 As discussed above, this requirement essentially echoed the requirements for constitutional ratification, placing constitutional amendment on nearly identical
procedural grounds with constitutional creation.
But Article V’s ancestry is even more complicated than
that, because the Article effectively shared a constitutional
womb with its own progeny. Although the Federalists pressed
the cause of ratification—frequently referring to the amendment process as a check on centralized power94—they were also
drafting and proposing the first amendments to the Constitution they had just created. The Founders’ treatment of those
proposals, which became the Bill of Rights, reveals much about

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 202–03 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
89. Id. at 22.
90. Carlos E. González, Representational Structures Through Which We
the People Ratify Constitutions: The Troubling Original Understanding of the
Constitution’s Ratification Clauses, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1373, 1445 (2005)
(“Article V was the product of two brief and unreflective sessions during the
last week of the Philadelphia drafting convention.”).
91. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 88, at
558–59.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 559. There was apparently no dissent to this proposal. Id.
94. KYVIG, supra note 84, at 66 (“Article V, the 1787 U.S. Constitution’s
provision for its own amendment, became the hinge upon which swung acceptance of the Philadelphia convention’s proposal.”); see also id. at 66–86 (describing Article V’s role in the ratification and adoption of the U.S. Constitution).
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their view of the amendments’ relation to the “original” Constitution.95
James Madison presented the first set of twelve amendments (ten of which would become the Bill of Rights, and
another of which would, 202 years later, become the Twentyseventh Amendment)96 to the first Congress, whose membership largely overlapped with that of the Philadelphia Convention itself.97 Madison’s amendments echoed language that
many states had proposed during their constitutional ratification conventions.98 But while Congress and the states approved
the Bill of Rights by the end of 1791,99 Congress was not as
clear on where it wanted to place the amendments, or what text
they were meant to change.
Madison suggested that the amendments be interwoven
with the text of the original Constitution. In his proposal, most
of the amendments—including versions of the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth—would have been inserted “in
article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4.”100 An earlier
version of the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of juries in
criminal cases would have been inserted in place of “article 3d,

95. I owe my understanding of the Bill of Rights’ placement to Kyvig’s illuminating discussion of this debate. For more detail and better storytelling
see Kyvig, supra note 66, at 28–30.
96. Brian C. Kalt, The People’s Forest and Levy’s Trees: Popular Sovereignty and the Origins of the Bill of Rights, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 124 n.9
(2000) (reviewing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1999)).
97. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in
the First Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1994) (listing some
of the holdover members and describing the First Congress as a continuation
of the Philadelphia Convention).
98. See, e.g., New York Ratification Convention (July 26, 1788), in
GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A
COMMENTARY app. I-2 at 305 (1995) (including the Declaration or Bill of
Rights); Virginia Ratification Convention (June 26–27, 1788), in ANASTAPLO,
supra, app. I-1 at 299 (including the Proposed Declaration or Bill of Rights).
99. Kalt, supra note 96, at 124–25.
100. James Madison’s Proposals in the House of Representatives (June 8,
1797), in ANASTAPLO, supra note 98, app. J-1 at 315, 316–17. Interestingly,
the Confederate Constitution of 1861, which adopted wholesale nearly ninety
percent of the Federal Constitution, effectuated Madison’s plan and rearranged the Bill of Rights, interspersing them throughout the rest of the Constitution. See generally MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE
CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
(1991). The first eight amendments were placed in Article I, Section 9, alongside the other restraints on congressional power. Id. at 142. The Ninth and
Tenth Amendments became part of Article VI. Id. at 150.
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section 2, the third clause.”101 At least in terms of their placement, then, Madison treated constitutional amendments the
way legislators treat statutory amendments: as strike-outs and
changes to the original text.
Roger Sherman objected that “this is not the proper mode
of amending the constitution. . . . We ought not to interweave
our propositions into the work itself, because it will be destructive of the whole fabric.”102 Sherman, who apparently saw the
amendments as a kind of state-created appendage to the
people’s Constitution, moved to add the amendments to the end
of the existing document.103 To do otherwise, he suggested,
would threaten the entire constitutional enterprise:
“The [C]onstitution is the act of the people, and ought to remain entire. But the amendments will be the act of the state governments;
again all the authority we possess, is derived from that instrument; if
we mean to destroy the whole and establish a new constitution, we
remove the basis on which we mean to build.”104

Madison responded that placing the amendments at the
end of the Constitution could cause “a very considerable embarrassment” because “it will be difficult to ascertain to what parts
of the instrument the amendments particularly refer; they will
create unfavorable comparisons, whereas if they are placed
upon the footing here proposed, they will stand upon as good
foundation as the original work.”105
Michael Jenifer Stone chimed in with a somewhat different
concern: Madison’s proposed placement would accord the
amendments too much respect, altering beyond recognition the
Constitution that the framers had just signed.106 Invoking the
already-deified George Washington, Stone argued that inserting amendments into the Constitution itself would suggest that
“George Washington, and the other worthy characters who
composed the convention, signed an instrument which they

101. James Madison’s Proposals in the House of Representatives (June 8,
1797), supra note 98, app. J-1 at 317–18.
102. The Congressional Register, 13 August 1789, in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
112, 117 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS].
103. KYVIG, supra note 84, at 100–01.
104. Id. at 100 (quoting The Congressional Register, 13 August 1789, supra
note 102, at 117).
105. The Congressional Register, 13 August 1789, supra note 102, at 118
(emphasis added).
106. Id. at 120.
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never had in contemplation.”107 Elbridge Gerry, voicing a view
of constitutional amendment similar to that described in Part
I.A of this Article, responded that amendments—no matter
where they were placed—would be, in accordance with the language of Article V, “valid to all intents and purposes, as part of
the [C]onstitution.”108 In Gerry’s view, Stone’s objection that
amending the Constitution meant replacing it proved either too
much or too little: “[C]onsequently the objection goes for nothing, or it goes against making any amendments whatever.”109
The House originally sided with Madison’s proposal, but
less than a week later reversed course and adopted Sherman’s.
This decision “set a precedent for all amendments to come: they
would follow the original text of the Constitution.”110 The first
Congress’s structural choice has had a major, albeit underappreciated, impact, not just on the appearance of the Constitution, but on its interpretation. A moment’s thought about how
different our constitutional law would look today without a
separate Bill of Rights should drive the point home. Would the
First Amendment be accorded such reverence, and be interpreted so broadly, if it were tucked into the other restrictions
on congressional power in Article I, Section 9? Would Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment have had such a revolutionary
impact if it had been added to Congress’s enumerated powers
in Article I, Section 8? Could (or should) future amendments be
inserted into the “original” Constitution?
By leaving the impact of amendment unclear, the ratifiers
of the Bill of Rights created the risk—feared by Madison—that
the amendments would be discarded as a mere appendage. But
they also left open the possibility that courts would interpret
the amendments’ impact broadly. Rather than being polished
away, many of the amendments’ blurry edges were reconceptualized as “penumbras”111 surrounding their core guarantees,
thus enabling some of the Supreme Court’s most rights107. Id.
108. Id. at 121–22.
109. Id. at 122.
110. Kyvig, supra note 66, at 29.
111. The most famous example, of course, is Justice Douglas’s opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), in which he found that
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” Justice
Black, in dissent, pointed out that the argument-from-fuzziness can cut both
ways, diluting rights just as easily as it can expand them. Id. at 509–10
(Black, J., dissenting).
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expansive decisions.112 In that sense, the Anti-Federalists actually won a victory, albeit perhaps unintentionally, by securing the Bill of Rights in the form of freestanding amendments
rather than as part of the original text. Since the Founders
were primarily concerned with controlling the power of the legislature and the executive—both of which were seen as more
powerful than the courts113—this court-centered power of interpretation may have vindicated their vision.
Madison’s fear that the amendments would not be accorded
the same respect as the original text does not seem to have
played out in practice, but his concern about the difficulty of interpretation certainly has. Just a week after the debate on the
amendments’ placement had ended, he wrote, “It is already apparent I think that some ambiguities will be produced by this
change, as the question will often arise and sometimes be not
easily solved, how far the original text is or is not necessarily
superseded, by the supplemental act.”114 Exploring and attempting to ascertain which parts of the Constitution have
been changed by which amendments is part of the major project
of this Article. The following Section considers a few interpretive methods of identifying amendments’ impact.
C. DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT
The previous two Sections set out, and then defend, the
theory that constitutional amendments can alter the meaning
of provisions of the original document, even without specifically
referring to them. This Section suggests ways for courts and
scholars to better identify the impact of amendments on specific
constitutional provisions. For every constitutional amendment
with a broad impact on the provisions of the original Constitu112. The right to privacy, which largely traces its lineage to Griswold, is
perhaps the most prominent example. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
564–65 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Griswold in accepting a right to personal privacy and finding a limited right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452–54 (1972) (citing Griswold for an individual’s right to privacy and use of contraceptives).
113. Alexander Hamilton famously referred to the judiciary as the “least
dangerous” branch. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note
70, at 522–23; see also RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 184
(1969) (“Legislative, not judicial, despotism worried the Founders; judges were
trusted, legislators were not.”).
114. Kyvig, supra note 66, at 30 (citing Letter from James Madison to Alexander White (Aug. 24, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 352
(Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979)).
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tion—such as the First or the Fourteenth—there are others
with a much more limited impact. The Twenty-first Amendment, for example, repeals the Eighteenth’s prohibition on the
“manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors.”115
But the Twenty-first Amendment has no clear impact on the
Exceptions Clause,116 nor on the provisions of Articles I or II,
except to the degree that it changed the executive’s power to
prosecute violations of the Eighteenth Amendment. It is a narrow and precise amendment whose impact falls squarely and
solely on another amendment, which it excises, and does nothing more.
The task for interpreters of the amendments (or of provisions of the amended Constitution) is thus, in part, to determine what parts of the Constitution the amendments mean to
amend. Does the First Amendment, which by its terms addresses only “Congress,” apply also to the exercise of power by
the executive branch?117 Does the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporate” the Bill of Rights and make those rights applicable
against the states?118 These are fundamental questions of constitutional law, but they are fundamentally different questions
from those regarding what specific amendments do or do not
allow. That is, the question of whether the First Amendment
does or does not permit the regulation of obscene speech is logically and analytically distinct from the question of whether the
Amendment restricts the power of Congress (thus “amending”
Article I) or the executive (thus “amending” Article II).119
It is the second set of questions that the present discussion
addresses, because the placement of the amendments at the
end of the Constitution inevitably raises them, and because
they have generally gone unasked. This is not to say that courts
and scholars are entirely without guidance. Legal scholars have
devoted extraordinary attention to the processes by which the

115. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
116. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
117. See Strauss, supra note 44, at 907 (explaining that the use of “Congress” in the First Amendment refers to the entire federal government, even
though other uses of “Congress” do not).
118. This question received one of its most famous treatments in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), with Justice
Black playing his usual role as the greatest proponent of the full-incorporation
theory, and Justice Frankfurter acting as his foil, id. at 59–68 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
119. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
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Constitution is amended120 and the content of specific constitutional amendments.121 Some scholars have even made inroads
in the difficult project of sorting amendments by type. Sanford
Levinson, for example, differentiates between “amendments”
and “interpretations,”122 and Bruce Ackerman draws a line between “transformative amendments”123 and those that are
“rightly interpreted as a superstatute.”124 But for all of the attention that constitutional amendment receives, surprisingly
little has been written about the impact that constitutional
amendment has on the original document.125
One promising interpretive tool for analyzing the relationship between different constitutional phrases—an analysis an
interpreter trying to give meaning to the amendments must
do—is Akhil Amar’s “intratextualism.”126 Amar describes this

120. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 18; see also Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 145, 160–61 (“The process of constitutional amendment, therefore, can take place on one of two levels. On the constitutional level, it can take place within the contours of the constitution itself . . . .
[But] the process of constitutional amendment may also take place at another
level, when these logically and politically antecedent conditions are themselves amended.”).
121. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 110, 110 (describing the “substantial—and
some might say overwhelming—body of scholarship on the ‘intent,’ ‘meaning,’
and ‘understanding’ of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
122. Levinson, supra note 53, at 33.
123. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 524; see also Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1056 (describing “structural” amendments).
124. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 522 (describing
the Twenty-sixth Amendment as such because “[a]ll it did was change the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen. Nobody looked upon it as the culminating
expression of a broad-based effort to revise the foundational principles of our
higher law”).
125. There is also a lengthy literature addressing the limitations, if any, on
the amending power, and whether courts should have any power to consider
the validity of amendments. See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 33; Tribe, supra
note 18.
The debate is long-running indeed. For older examples, see William L.
Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power, 33 HARV. L. REV. 223,
228 (1919) (arguing that amendments may not take away the legislative power of the states), and William L. Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the
United States, 33 HARV. L. REV. 659, 662–63 (1920) (arguing in response to
Marbury that states’ rights are already adequately protected and that the Supreme Court should have no power to approve or disapprove amendments).
126. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).
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theory as a kind of “holistic” textualism,127 whose practitioners
(among whom Amar counts such luminaries as Chief Justice
Marshall128 and Justice Story129) read seemingly isolated constitutional phrases in conjunction as a way to give meaning to
both.130 In Amar’s words, an interpreter employing intratextualism “tries to read a contested word or phrase that appears
in the Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase.”131
Although Amar does not argue as much, intratextualism is
most powerful when applied to the relationship between
amendments and the text of the original Constitution, rather
than to that between phrases in the original Constitution. In
fact, the amendments all but beg for an intratextualist reading
because they (for the reasons described in the previous Section)
exist only as appendages to a document.132 Amar himself has
compared the Bill of Rights to a constitution,133 but it is clear
that the amendments presuppose—and rely on—some kind of
preexisting document.134 They create affirmative limits on the
enumerated powers laid out in the original Constitution, and
the former are incoherent without the latter. To take the first
few words of the Bill of Rights as an illustrative example,
“Congress shall make no law”135 makes no sense without a
prior Article establishing the existence of Congress and its
power to make law in the first place.136

127. Id. at 785.
128. Id. at 755–58 (describing Marshall’s use of intratextualism in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
129. Id. at 758–63 (discussing Story’s use of intratextualism in Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)).
130. Id. at 748–49.
131. Id. at 748.
132. By pointing to the location of the amendments as well as their wording, I am admittedly blending intertextualism with what Amar calls “[a]nother
brand of holistic textualism,” which “squeezes meaning from the Constitution’s
organization chart.” Id. at 797 n.197.
133. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1205 (1991).
134. In this sense, intratextualism as it applies to the amendments becomes a kind of intertextualism that connects the “separate” amendments and
Constitution.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136. See Vermeule & Young, supra note 45, at 738 (“It is critical to understand . . . that clause-bound interpretation is itself a component of intratextualism. Standing alone, even a strong version of intratextualism is necessarily incomplete.”).
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Assessing the merits of his theory, Amar writes that
“[p]erhaps the greatest virtue of intratextualism is this: it takes
seriously the document as a whole rather than as a jumbled
grab bag of assorted clauses.”137 This is undoubtedly a virtue
when analyzing the text of the original Constitution. It is a necessity when analyzing the amendments. Without the gravitational pull of interpretation tying them to the Constitution,
they would spin off into space like so many rogue satellites.138
Although it is plausible, if debatable, that the framers who
drafted and ratified the Article IV Territories Clause (“The
Congress shall have Power to . . . make all needful Rules and
Regulations”)139 had in mind the Article I Necessary and Proper Clause (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper”),140 it is certain that
they had the original Constitution in mind when they wrote the
amendments. Like the drafters of statutory amendments,141 the
authors and ratifiers of constitutional amendments must be
presumed to have some fault or omission of the original Constitution in mind.142 Implicitly applying this theory, Amar argues
persuasively that the similarity between “Congress shall make
no law”143 and the words of the Necessary and Proper Clause—
“Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws”144—echo
137. Amar, supra note 126, at 795.
138. I note that my argument here—which requires judges to connect two
disparate parts of the Constitution—is, like Amar’s intratextualism, vulnerable to the criticism that it demands too much of judges whose interpretive capacities are limited. See Vermeule & Young, supra note 45, at 731. However, I
do not think that this objection is fatal, nor do I see a better alternative. The
First Amendment must mean something, and because the amendments are
not included in the Constitution as strike-throughs, some interpreter must determine their relationship to the rest of the Constitution. Cf. Stone v. INS, 514
U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it
intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”).
139. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
140. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The example, though not the argument, comes
from Amar, supra note 126, at 794.
141. Despite the comparative length and complexity of statutes vis-à-vis
the Constitution, Congress is presumed to know the content of the statutes it
is amending. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction,
87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 70–78 (1988) (suggesting use of an acquiescence rule in
interpreting legislative inaction).
142. For those few amendments which are more properly considered additions—or, in Ackerman’s terms, “superstatutes,” see supra note 124 and accompanying text—the drafters may have been more concerned with omissions
from the Constitution than with problems with its terms.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
144. Id. art. I. § 8, cl. 18.
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each other, suggesting a “textual interlock.”145 After consulting
the constitutional history for confirmation, he concludes that
the First Amendment sought to “reassure all concerned that
Congress lacked enumerated power to restrict speech and press
(or to regulate religion, for that matter) in the states, notwithstanding the Necessary and Proper Clause.”146
But while textual connections may be sufficient to show
what part or parts of the Constitution an amendment was
meant to alter, they are certainly not necessary, even for interpreters who would otherwise prefer a “textual” approach. If
such connections were required, many amendments would be
rendered meaningless. The Eleventh Amendment, for example,
was clearly a reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia,147 in which the
Supreme Court held that Section 2 of Article III permitted suits
against a state by citizens of another state.148 The Eleventh
Amendment prohibits those very suits: “The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”149 Nevertheless, nothing in the
language of the Eleventh Amendment names Chisholm or Article III as its intended target.150
Moreover, in interpreting these amendments, courts have
not limited the amendments’ reach to simply “overturning” or
undermining a single case, even if a single case clearly inspired
their passage. Rather, their broad language has given rise to

145. Amar, supra note 126, at 814.
146. Id.
147. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see also James E. Pfander, Rethinking the
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV.
555, 651 (1994) (“Everyone appears to agree that the Eleventh Amendment
was passed in response to Chisholm.”).
148. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
150. The Eleventh Amendment is one of four amendments passed to “overrule” specific decisions of the Supreme Court; the other amendments are Section 1 of the Fourteenth, the Sixteenth, and the Twenty-sixth. JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUPREME COURT 49 & n.133 (1980).
None of them, however, identify the decision they were intended to overturn.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth, for example, fails to identify Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), as its intended target. Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36, 72–74 (1872) (noting that “the first clause of the
first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was framed” primarily to reverse
Dred Scott); CHOPER, supra, at n.133.
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penumbras151 and interpretations that expanded their impact
to include other provisions of the Constitution, including those
uninvolved in the decisions they overturned.152
Rather than attempting to describe the relationship between constitutional amendments and the text they amend,
constitutional theorists have for the most part focused on other
thorny amendment-related questions: When is constitutional
amendment justified?153 Are there any inherent limits on the
impact of amendments?154 Is Article V the only way to amend
the Constitution?155 And what of the neglected “convention method” for constitutional amendment?156 Although all of these
questions cast light on the process of constitutional amendment, and may also help illuminate the content of amendments, none addresses the core question tentatively answered
in this Part: the impact of constitutional amendment on the
original Constitution. The following Part uses this theory—that
amendments alter rather than simply add to the original Constitution—to measure the impact of a constitutional amendment on another, particularly problematic provision of the original Constitution: the Exceptions Clause.
II. AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
The previous Part argued that constitutional amendments
often implicitly amend prior constitutional provisions even
without indicating the text they were meant to target. Interpreters of the Constitution and its amendments thus face a difficult task in identifying, often in the absence of clear textual
clues, which provisions have been altered by subsequent
amendment. This Part applies that theory of constitutional
amendment to the Exceptions Clause, whose apparently unbounded reach has long troubled constitutional and federal
151. Justice Douglas’ famous invocation of “penumbras” in Griswold included the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
152. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text (arguing that the
placement of amendments at the end of the Constitution, and the inclusion of
non-specific language, allows a rights-expansive jurisprudence that would not
be possible if they were simply made as strike-outs to the original text).
153. See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, GREAT AND
EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 7 (1999) (suggesting guidelines for constitutional amendments).
154. See supra note 51.
155. See supra note 60.
156. See supra note 52.
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courts scholars. It thus offers courts and scholars a new way to
respond to the thorny problem of jurisdiction stripping, one
that does not rely on internal, unenumerated “essential functions,” but rather uses constitutional text to satisfy scholars’
instinctual belief that there must be limits on congressional
power to strip federal jurisdiction. “External constraints” theorists have already begun to construct a theory that limits the
Exceptions Clause, relying on various other constitutional provisions to articulate those limits. But their arguments too often
rest on a simple assertion that the Exceptions Clause is limited
by other provisions of the Constitution, and fail to address the
inconvenient fact that none of those provisions mention the Exceptions Clause. By exploring the impact of one particularly
important kind of external constraint—constitutional amendment—and thickening the understanding of “external constraints” more generally, this Article builds on the external
constraints theory and suggests that the First Amendment may
have already implicitly amended the Clause. It then argues
that future amendments could do the same explicitly.
A. WHY IT MATTERS: USING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE TO
“AMEND” THE CONSTITUTION
Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction derives from the
Exceptions Clause, a grant of congressional power nestled
alongside the various jurisdiction-granting provisions of Article
III.157 The Exceptions Clause is the broadest grant of congressional power in the original Constitution158 not found in Article
I, and it gives Congress wide authority to alter and abolish federal court jurisdiction.159 In context, the Clause reads: “In all
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall

157. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
158. I thus set aside for now Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
other Congress-empowering amendments. See id. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.”); see also infra notes 239–40 and 252–56 and accompanying text.
159. See Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions
Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 389 (1983) (“Those who argue against
Congress’ power to make exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction . . . .
are forced to deny an explicit power of Congress, expressly granted by the
Constitution . . . .”).
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make.”160 Unfortunately, constitutional history does not shed
much light on the reasons for the Clause’s placement or meaning of its words. The “exceptions and regulations” language
“was adopted by the Convention on August 27 without a ripple
of recorded debate, concern, or explication.”161 In fact, the only
substantial debate about the Clause revolved around whether
the Supreme Court’s review in admiralty and equity cases
would involve both facts and law.162
Despite this sparse constitutional history, it is reasonably
clear that the Exceptions Clause power applies only to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Article III defines the federal courts’ jurisdiction as extending to “all” cases arising under
the Constitution, federal laws, treaties, or admiralty and maritime laws.163 This includes, for example, cases arising under
the amendments, such as the First, the Fourteenth, or any future amendments like the ERA. Because Article III places
these cases under the appellate (rather than original) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,164 they are subject to congressional
power under the Exceptions Clause.165

160. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
161. Sager, supra note 29, at 51; see also Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents
and Beginnings to 1801, in 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 240 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971) (noting that the Clause “was not debated” by the Convention). For an exhaustive recounting of what drafting history there is, see Laurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take
Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 64, 81–87
(2007) (asserting that the “complaint that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction would let distant judicial elites substitute their will for the findings
of juries” was “[a]lmost fatal to the Constitution’s adoption”).
162. BERGER, supra note 113, at 286–89 (arguing that the Exceptions
Clause was originally intended to give Congress power over appellate review
of fact findings); Claus, supra note 161, at 64; Gressman & Gressman, supra
note 29, at 526–27.
163. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall paraphrased Article III as stating that “[t]he judicial power of
the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.”
164. Congress has never granted federal courts complete jurisdiction over
all cases “arising under” the Constitution or federal law. It did, however, extend general federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts in 1875.
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2000)).
165. The Exceptions Clause does not give Congress power to expand or contract the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 174–75; Sager, supra note 29, at 24.
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Theoretically,166 should it choose to do so, Congress could
strip lower federal courts of the power to hear all cases arising
under a particular amendment, or under the Constitution itself,167 and could do the same for the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over such cases.168 Congress could, for example,
pass a law saying that the Supreme Court shall have no power
to hear cases involving the First Amendment, or the Fourteenth. And as the introduction to this Article suggested, the
more politicized the subject matter of an amendment, the more
likely that amendment is to be the target of a subsequent jurisdiction-stripping proposal.169 The proposed ERA, to take just
one example, would be a prime candidate.
Although it has never directly stripped the Supreme Court
of jurisdiction to hear cases arising under a particular amendment, Congress has boldly used its Exceptions Clause power to
propose stripping federal jurisdiction (including that of the Supreme Court) over certain unfavored subject matters.170 Among
the recent high-profile examples are congressional attempts to
deny the Guantánamo detainees access to federal courts.171
Other proposals would have done the same for cases involving
abortion,172 school desegregation,173 or school prayer.174 As
166. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of possible inherent or externally
imposed limitations on this power.
167. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973) (“It is apparent
that neither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring
every federal question arising under the federal law, or even every criminal
prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and protection against salary reduction.”).
168. One striking illustration of Congress’s broad power over appellate jurisdiction, at least to modern readers, is the fact that between the passage of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, and the Act of December 23, 1914, 38
Stat. 790, the Court had no appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions
that struck down state laws that conflicted with the Federal Constitution. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 320–21 (5th ed. 2003).
169. Perhaps the point could be put more finely. Amendments passed as a
result of a temporary crest in popularity, or a concerted but fleeting campaign—the Eighteenth Amendment, establishing Prohibition, is the best example—are those most vulnerable to jurisdiction-stripping proposals, because
the temporary majorities that created them are likely to dissolve.
170. See, e.g., Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary Has ‘Run Amok,’ Adding Congress Is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
8, 2005, at A21.
171. See supra notes 8–9 (discussing the Military Commissions Act).
172. S. 210, 98th Cong. (1983) (stripping in entirety lower federal court jurisdiction over abortion cases and severely curtailing the Supreme Court’s ju-
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many scholars have noted, such jurisdiction-stripping proposals
tend to come in waves,175 often in reaction to controversial Supreme Court rulings—or even anticipated rulings—in politically charged areas of constitutional law.176
What scholars have generally failed to note, however, and
what this Article attempts to make plain, is how the political
and legal justifications and impact of jurisdiction-stripping
proposals mimic those of constitutional amendments. Most recent amendment proposals are initiated in response to, or anticipation of, unpopular court decisions. Similarly, many jurisdiction-stripping proposals—such as the Marriage Protection
Act,177 which would have eliminated federal jurisdiction to interpret or assess the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act178—are patently designed to keep amendment-based
constitutional claims out of federal court. Whether proposed as
amendments or jurisdiction-stripping bills, the effect of these
initiatives is to limit federal courts’ power over controversial
subject matter.
Stripping federal jurisdiction over an amendment, or any
other piece of law is, of course, not exactly the same thing as
deleting the amendment.179 Some scholars, for example, have
argued that Congress’s power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction carries with it a correrisdiction over the same); see also H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. § 4 (1981) (same); S.
158, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981) (limiting lower court jurisdiction over abortion cases).
173. H.R. 521, 98th Cong. (1983).
174. See infra Part II.C.
175. Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18
VAND. L. REV. 925, 926 tbl.1 (1965) (demonstrating that jurisdiction-stripping
efforts between 1802 and 1957 were concentrated in seven time periods).
176. See Shirley M. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing
Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 842–43 (1972)
(“[C]ongressional reaction to issues of federal jurisdiction has always been fitful and . . . the fits are usually induced by strong pressures imposed by particular events or by powerful constituencies that seek to influence results in particular causes that concern them.”). Senator Jesse Helms, a strong proponent
of many jurisdiction-stripping bills, made the point quite clearly: “[T]here is
more than one way to skin a cat, and there is more than one way for Congress
to provide a check on arrogant Supreme Court Justices who routinely distort
the Constitution to suit their own motions [sic] of public policy.” 130 CONG.
REG. 5919 (1984) (statement of Sen. Helms).
177. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (providing that no state shall be required to
give effect to another state’s recognition of same-sex marriage).
179. The latter can be achieved only through another amendment, which
has happened only once. See supra note 27.
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sponding legislative duty to grant equivalent jurisdiction to
other federal courts.180 Perhaps more importantly, Congress
has no control over state courts,181 and state court judges are
bound by the Supremacy Clause to apply and enforce federal
rights.182 But even if these safeguards are available to protect
constitutional rights that legislation has barred from the Supreme Court’s docket, the intent and effect of jurisdictionstripping proposals is generally to burden the exercise of those
rights.183 For example, although state courts would continue to
hear cases involving such rights, scholars have long noted that
state courts’ enforcement of Court precedent can be imperfect,
or even defiantly resistant.184 In such a situation, stripping the
180. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 741, 778 (1984).
181. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64
n.15 (1982).
182. Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction, 27
VILL. L. REV. 959, 961 (1982); see U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 3; see also D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16 (1983) (“We have noted
the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims.”); N.
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64 n.15 (“[V]irtually all matters that might be heard in
Art. III courts could also be left by Congress to state courts.”); Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts cannot discriminate
against the enforcement of federal rights).
183. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIMITING COURT
JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: “COURT-STRIPPING” 2
(2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32171_20050124.pdf
(“[P]roponents of these proposals are generally critical of specific decisions
made by the federal courts in the particular substantive area, and the proposals are represented as intended to influence the results or applications of such
cases.”); see also Tribe, supra note 10, at 145 (“Unless Congress is merely replacing one remedial structure with another that is as protective of the constitutional right at stake, withdrawing a basic civil or criminal line of defense
from such a right is tantamount to authorizing its deprivation.” (footnote omitted)). A jurisdiction-stripping bill could also be used more aggressively, in conjunction with other federal legislation. For example, Congress could pass a law
that simultaneously criminalizes certain speech acts that are at the boundary
of the First Amendment and also strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
challenges to the law. The Guantánamo jurisdiction-stripping legislation, in
conjunction with the executive’s expansion of the military tribunal system, has
had substantially this effect.
184. See Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review:
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929,
936–38 (1982) (arguing that stripping the Supreme Court’s appellate review
would leave lower courts free to ignore existing Court precedent); see also Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=981015
(describing state courts’ defiance of Supreme Court precedent, sometimes with
the Court’s apparent blessing).
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Court’s jurisdiction may be a thinly veiled attempt to signal to
state courts that they now have the power to undo the Court’s
constitutional handiwork.185
These attempts illustrate a basic but often unrecognized
truth: when Congress strips jurisdiction over a particular subject matter, it often does so to protect laws in that subjectmatter area from challenges brought under constitutional provisions or other legal bases. It is the grounds for challenge that
suffer. So if Congress were to completely strip federal jurisdiction over challenges to the constitutionality of military commissions, for example, the “damage” would be to the Suspension
Clause,186 the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,187 and the
other legal grounds on which plaintiffs might challenge the military commissions. Unlike amendments, however, which can
“reverse” the impact of unpopular amendments or Court decisions, jurisdiction-stripping is most effective as a preventative
measure, to keep the Court from making such decisions in the
first place.188 A public prayer amendment would effectively alter the Constitution to say that school prayer does not violate
the Establishment Clause,189 while a jurisdiction-stripping act
185. Laurence Sager famously characterized these jurisdiction-stripping
proposals as “lewd wink[s]” from Congress to the state courts. Sager, supra
note 29, at 41.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”).
187. Id. amends. IV–VI (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures and guaranteeing due process and other criminal prosecution rights).
188. See Fellow, supra note 19, at 1121–22 (noting that “the mere possibility of action . . . prompted a congressional response” in the form of “courtcurbing bills”). Jurisdiction stripping does not reverse Supreme Court
precedent and would (at least theoretically) have the perverse effect (from
their proponents’ perspective) of insulating those cases from federal review.
See Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: Legislative Attempts to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 AM. U.
L. REV. 497, 537 (1983) (“Should the Supreme Court be divested of jurisdiction
over a particular area, the Court’s last pronouncement on the subject would
constitute the definitive, unalterable law, which lower courts would be obliged
to follow forever.”).
One might argue that this point undermines my argument that amendments and jurisdiction-stripping legislation are closely related, because it suggests that jurisdiction stripping is a proactive measure used (albeit somewhat
inartfully) to freeze Court precedent into place, while amendments are a reactive measure to overturn decisions. There is merit to this point, though I believe that the gap it illustrates is small.
189. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 73, 98th Cong. (1983) (“Nothing in this Constitution
shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or
other public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States or
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on the same subject would prevent federal courts from ruling
that it does.190 While jurisdiction stripping does not necessarily
amend the Constitution, it can have a similar effect by insulating an entire issue from constitutional challenge. The next Section considers possible limits on this congressional power, specifically analyzing whether these jurisdiction-stripping
proposals are subject to the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause, and, if so, whether they pass.
B. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXCEPTIONS
CLAUSE POWER
Federal courts scholars have long sensed, but struggled to
find, limits on the Exceptions Clause power, and the Supreme
Court has stubbornly refused to give them help. As the discussion in this Section demonstrates, the Court has generally
yielded to Congress on specific jurisdiction-stripping legislation
while also carefully suggesting that the Exceptions Clause may
have some as-yet-undefined restrictions. Congressional power
to strip federal jurisdiction is thus generally considered to be
nearly, or perhaps completely,191 limitless.192
by any State to participate in prayer.”); H.R.J. Res. 133, 98th Cong. (1983).
These amendment proposals have a longer history than many realize. Consider an amendment proposed by Christian fundamentalists in the 1800s, which
would have read, “Almighty God [is] the Author of National Existence and the
source of all power and authority in Civil Government, Jesus Christ [is] the
Rule of Nations, and the Bible [is] the formation of law and supreme rule for
the conduct of nations.” KYVIG, supra note 84, at 189; see also id. at 190 (“Between 1894 and 1910 Congress received at least nine proposals to alter the
Constitution’s preamble to express trust in or acknowledge the authority of a
Christian God.”).
190. See infra Part II.C (discussing acts which would strip federal jurisdiction over school prayer cases).
191. See, e.g., Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
655 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting on other grounds) (“Congress need not
give this Court any appellate power; it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction
once conferred and it may do so even while a case is sub judice.”); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 472–73 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting on other
grounds) (“Congress has plenary power to confer or withhold appellate jurisdiction . . . . ”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossier ed., 1961) (“[T]he national legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove . . . inconveniences.”), cited in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 567–68 (1962); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 260 (1973) (“The power to make exceptions to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is a plenary power. It is given
in express terms and without limitation . . . .”).
192. Sager, supra note 29, at 37 (acknowledging, although not endorsing,
the “sense that Congress is immune from full constitutional scrutiny when the
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In Ex parte McCardle, the first of three major post–Civil
War jurisdiction-stripping cases, the Supreme Court considered
a habeas corpus challenge brought by an individual alleging
that he was unlawfully detained by the military in Mississippi
following the Civil War.193 The Court heard oral arguments in
the case, but before it could issue a decision, Congress repealed
the 1867 Act “affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this [C]ourt
in cases of habeas corpus.”194 Justice Salmon Chase explained
that the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “is conferred ‘with such
exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall
make,’”195 and concluded that the repeal of the law validly
withdrew that jurisdiction.196 Justice Chase specifically noted,
however, that other avenues for appeal remained open,197 a
reading that the Court reiterated almost immediately in Ex
parte Yerger,198 another case involving congressional attempts
to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas cases.
Acknowledging that its jurisdiction “is given subject to exception and regulation by Congress,”199 the Court in Ex parteYerger nonetheless endorsed something of a clear-statement rule,
and concluded that the asserted jurisdiction-stripping measure
was ambiguous and thus insufficient to strip the Court’s jurisdiction over the pending case.200
The final case in the post–Civil War jurisdiction-stripping
triumvirate was United States v. Klein, in which the Court
struck down a congressional attempt to withdraw the Court’s
jurisdiction over a pending case involving a legislative act that
altered the impact of a presidential pardon.201 The Court ruled
that the jurisdiction-stripping statute in Klein was impermissidistribution of jurisdiction is at stake”); Harrison Tweed, Provisions of the
Constitution Concerning the Supreme Court of the United States, 31 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1951) (“There are comparatively few who recognize that under the
express words of the Constitution . . . Congress can largely, if not entirely, deprive the Court of this [appellate] jurisdiction.”).
193. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
194. Id. at 514.
195. Id. at 513.
196. Id. at 514.
197. Id. at 515 (“The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any
cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867.”).
198. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 (1868).
199. Id. at 102; see also id. at 98 (“[A]ppellate jurisdiction is subject to such
exceptions, and must be exercised under such regulations as Congress, in the
exercise of its discretion, has made or may see fit to make.”).
200. Id. at 103.
201. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 128–29 (1871).
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ble because it essentially prescribed a rule of decision (favoring
the government) in a pending case,202 and also because it “impair[ed] the effect of a pardon, and thus infring[ed] the constitutional power of the Executive.”203
Looking to this trio of cases and a few others,204 courts, politicians,205 and constitutional scholars206 have long sensed the
existence of, but struggled to find, a limit on Congress’s power
over federal jurisdiction.207 Their efforts to ascertain possible
restrictions have yielded two main theories: “internal” limitations based on the logic and structure of Article III, and “external” limitations imposed by the rest of the Constitution.
The search for internal constraints has framed the “main
battleground for the debate about congressional authority over
federal court jurisdiction.”208 The most famous attempt to articulate internal constraints on the Exceptions Clause is undoubtedly that of Henry Hart, who argued that congressional power
over jurisdiction is inherently limited by the nature of the constitutional enterprise and the need to preserve the “essential
functions” of the judiciary.209 In Hart’s words, exceptions to the

202. See id. at 147.
203. Id.
204. See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996).
205. Senator Barry Goldwater, troubled by jurisdiction-stripping proposals
advanced by fellow Republicans, said in 1982:
What particularly troubles me about trying to override constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court by a simple bill is that I see no
limit to the practice. There is no clear and coherent standard to define
why we shall control the court in one area but not another. . . .
....
Whether or not [C]ongress possesses the power of curbing judicial
authority, we should not invoke it.
128 CONG. REC. 2243 (1982).
206. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 132 (“But surely the proponents of that
view [that Congress must have plenary power over federal jurisdiction] have
pushed their point too far.”).
207. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring) (giving examples of
situations where “the question whether the statute exceeded Congress’s Exceptions Clause power would be open”); FALLON ET AL., supra note 168, at
341–42 (“[T]he limits of congressional power over Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction have never been completely clarified.”).
208. Gunther, supra note 32, at 900.
209. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953).
Although Hart is rightfully seen as the father of the internal constraints
theory, his seminal work also implicitly acknowledges the existence of “external” constraints. See id. at 1372 (“Q. You’re saying, then, that the power to re-
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Court’s jurisdiction must “not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”210
Variants on this argument are common,211 with one popular
textualist hybrid arguing that the very use of the word “exceptions” suggests that there must be some amount of jurisdiction
left over after Congress is done “excepting.”212
Other scholars have rejected the internal constraints
theory213 and have instead looked outside of Article III for “external” constraints in the rest of the Constitution.214 The leading light for this search party is Lawrence Sager, who has argued that jurisdiction-stripping legislation must preserve the
ability of the federal courts to effectively supervise state conduct.215 He bolsters this structural claim by noting that only
Article III judges receive insulation from political pressure
through benefits such as life tenure and nondiminution of sala-

gulate jurisdiction is subject in part to the other provisions of the Constitution? A. No. It’s subject in whole not in part.”).
210. Id. at 1365. One might rightfully wonder, based on the discussion of
amendment in Part I, to which “plan” one is supposed to look. The original
plan of the Founders? Or the new “plan” embodied in the amended Constitution? What if the latter contemplates a lessened judicial role?
211. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1039 (1982) (“A statute depriving
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over . . . [a] category of constitutional litigation would, however, violate the spirit of the Constitution, even if
it would not violate its letter. . . . because the structure contemplated by the
instrument makes sense . . . only on the premise that there would be a federal
Supreme Court with the power to pronounce uniform and authoritative rules
of federal law.”); Ratner, supra note 184; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional
Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
157, 168–70 (1960) (arguing that, because an exception is “an exclusion from
the application of a general rule or description,” by definition “an exception
cannot destroy the essential characteristics of the subject to which it applies”);
Handman, supra note 28, at 206 (“Essential functions scholars . . . have continued to emphasize the Court’s primary role as guarantor of uniformity and
supremacy of federal law.”).
212. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 10, at 134–35; William S. Dodge, Note,
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an “Essential Role,” 100 YALE L.J. 1013,
1021 (1991).
213. See Redish, supra note 29, at 911 (“[T]he ‘essential functions’ thesis is
little more than constitutional wishful thinking . . . .”).
214. See Handman, supra note 28, at 200 (“The doctrine of political accountability, as a generally applicable, external constraint on congressional power,
requires Congress to address affirmatively underlying policy concerns when it
seeks to revoke Court jurisdiction.”).
215. Sager, supra note 29, at 43.
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ry.216 Sager also suggests that Congress cannot manipulate jurisdiction as a means to an unconstitutional end,217 nor deny
federal jurisdiction where such jurisdiction is necessary to provide an adequate remedy.218 Picking up this thread, William
Van Alstyne, among others,219 argues that “broad as the power
is in Congress to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, it is not exempt from other constitutional provisions, lying outside the ‘exceptions’ clause, that indeed
describe limitations that cut across most of the enumerated
powers of Congress.”220 Within theorists’ discussion of possible
limits on congressional power to strip jurisdiction, by far the
most commonly identified “external constraints” on the Exceptions Clause are the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and
equal protection guarantees.221 Indeed, along with separation of
powers concerns,222 the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses are apparently presumed to be the only (or perhaps
just the only necessary) external constraints on Congress’s Exceptions Clause power.223
The Supreme Court, for its part, has carefully avoided endorsing or disclaiming either the essential functions or external
216. Id. at 61–68. Martin Redish characterizes this as a “‘floating’ essential
functions thesis.” Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77
NW. U. L. REV. 143, 145 (1982).
217. Sager, supra note 29, at 68–80.
218. Id. at 80–89.
219. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 32, at 898; Redish, supra note 216, at
161–66 (suggesting that the Due Process Clause may provide such an external
restraint).
220. Constitutional Restraints upon the Judiciary: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.
98, 132 (1981) (statement of William Van Alstyne, Professor of Law, Duke
University).
221. See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 183, at 12 (discussing the Equal Protection Clause); Claus, supra note 161, at 115 (referring to the Suspension, Due
Process, and Petition Clauses); Rossum, supra note 159, at 420 (“The due
process clause of the fifth amendment plays an especially prominent role in
this argument.”); Sager, supra note 29, at 78–79; Van Alstyne, supra note 191,
at 263–66 (pointing to due process constraints on the Exceptions Clause).
222. Hooper, supra note 6, at 518 (“Simply, congressional measures regulating jurisdiction must comport with the constitutional requirements of equal
protection, due process, and separation of powers.”); Fellow, supra note 19, at
1131–32 (identifying separation of powers and due process-based arguments
as two of the three leading arguments, with essential functions being the third
and “weakest”).
223. But see Gressman & Gressman, supra note 29, at 523–24 (arguing
that jurisdiction-stripping legislation, like all other congressional acts, must
be “necessary and proper”).
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constraints thesis. Many of its decisions have suggested that
Congress’s power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is plenary.224 But the Court has also taken pains to suggest the existence of yet-unidentified limits, repeatedly ruling that although
this or that jurisdiction-stripping act might keep a particular
claim out of federal court, the Court still retains jurisdiction
through some other mechanism,225 perhaps implicitly suggesting the preservation of some core of essential functions. In other cases, however, the Court has suggested that the Exceptions
Clause may be limited by external constraints. Klein, for example, lends implicit support to such an approach. In Klein, the
Court struck down a jurisdiction-stripping law in part because
it would have violated the executive’s pardon power, as described in Article II, Section 2.226 At least implicitly, then,
Klein’s holding endorsed a separation of powers limitation on
the Exceptions Clause. The Court has never, however, addressed the central question of whether amendments to the
Constitution represent a special kind of external constraint.
The most notable case—perhaps the only case—addressing that
question is the Second Circuit’s opinion in Battaglia v. General
Motors Corp., which held that
the exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to
compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
That is to say, while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme
Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person of

224. See The “Francis Wright,” 105 U.S. 381, 385 (1881) (“[W]hile the appellate power of this court under the Constitution extends to all cases within
the judicial power of the United States, actual jurisdiction under the power is
confined within such limits as Congress sees fit to prescribe.”); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119 (1847) (“By the constitution of the United States,
the Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred
upon it by act of Congress; nor can it, when conferred be exercised in any other
form, or by any other mode of proceeding than that which the law prescribes.”).
225. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (interpreting
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as not completely
stripping habeas jurisdiction in immigration cases because doing so would
“raise serious constitutional problems”); see also supra notes 193–203 and accompanying text (discussing McCardle, Yerger, and other jurisdictionstripping cases); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661–62 (1996) (“[S]ince [the
AEDPA] does not repeal our authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, there can be no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court
of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2.”).
226. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1871); see also Tribe, supra note 10, at
140.
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life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take private
property without just compensation.227

The Second Circuit did not, however, explore the theory of external constraints on which its opinion implicitly rested.
The external constraints line of reasoning, though less
popular,228 is ultimately more promising than the search for internal constraints. Unfortunately, external constraints theorists have not yet engaged in the close textual and structural
analysis that their theory demands. To date, no external constraints theorist has given sustained attention to the impact of
any particular constitutional provision on the Exceptions
Clause, with Sager’s lengthy explanation of Article III’s tenure
requirements being perhaps the closest attempt.229 As a result,
the connection between external constraints and the Exceptions Clause remains undertheorized and in some sense incomplete. This Article attempts to fill that gap by addressing a particular
kind
of
external
constraint—constitutional
amendment—that demands special treatment.
In addition to filling the gap in external constraints theory,
exploring constitutional amendment as an external constraint
further illustrates the link between constitutional amendment
and Exceptions Clause theory. Just as proposals to amend the
Constitution and jurisdiction-stripping bills are closely related,
the themes and questions of Exceptions Clause scholarship
echo in amendment scholarship. Indeed, amendment scholarship has its own versions of the plenary power thesis,230 the
“essential functions” thesis,231 and “external constraints” theo227. 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948); accord Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (holding
that judicial relief “cannot be granted to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause”).
Lindsey involved an Oregon law that imposed special burdens on tenants, but
not landlords, wishing to appeal adverse decisions. Id. at 64. Thus it did not
address, or even mention, the Exceptions Clause.
228. Gunther, supra note 32, at 900; Handman, supra note 28, at 205 (describing the debate about Congress’s power over jurisdiction as being “largely
between only two schools of thought”: the implicit internal constraints theory
and a broad reading of congressional power).
229. See Sager, supra note 29, at 61–68.
230. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97
HARV. L. REV. 446, 448 (1983) (“Congress is constitutionally free to propose,
and the states to ratify, any amendment whatsoever.”); Note, The Faith to
Change: Reconciling the Oath to Uphold with the Power to Amend, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1747, 1747 (1996) [hereinafter The Faith to Change] (“The orthodox
understanding of Article V is that it is unlimited . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
231. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION
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ries.232 In many ways, amendment scholarship and Exceptions
Clause scholarship are two troubled families with more in
common than either seems to realize. The next Section demonstrates this interconnectivity in exploring whether the First
Amendment has amended the Exceptions Clause.
C. IMPLICITLY AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE: THE
(POSSIBLE) EXAMPLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Part I of this Article argued that constitutional provisions
can be, and often are, altered by constitutional amendments
even when not specifically mentioned by the amendments
themselves. The first two Sections of Part II described the use
of the Exceptions Clause to strip federal court jurisdiction, and
the attempts of scholars to find limits on that power. This Section attempts to bring these two lines of inquiry together by
considering whether, and how, one particular amendment—the
First—has “amended” the Exceptions Clause, imposing the limitations that federal courts scholars have long hoped to find.
The First Amendment says in part that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . or abridging the freedom of speech.”233 As Part I argued, despite the
fact that the First Amendment makes no reference to Article I,
the First Amendment nonetheless amends Article I’s grants of
congressional power. The lack of textual reference to the targeted provision of the original Constitution does not undermine
the First Amendment’s effect on Article I; the two are tied together not by the literal words of the Constitution, but by their
shared focus on congressional power.
But as the previous two Sections made clear, Article I is
not the sole repository of that power. The Exceptions Clause,
though located in Article III instead of Article I, is fundamentally a grant of legislative power. And whether found in Article
205 (1993) (arguing that the scope of amendment “is bound by the rules of the
American constitutional enterprise”); Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra
note 18, at 469–71 & n.31 (suggesting that a “Christianity Amendment” would
be constitutional, but that an amendment repealing dualist democracy might
not be); Murphy, supra note 54, at 164; Tribe, supra note 18, at 438–39 (suggesting that some amendments would not “fit” with the constitutional plan).
232. See, e.g., Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1074 (1991) (arguing that the Flag Burning
Amendment would violate the Ninth Amendment); The Faith to Change, supra
note 230 (arguing that Article VII’s oath requirement limits the scope of the
amendments that Congress may propose under Article V).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2008]

AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE

1017

I or elsewhere, grants of congressional authority in the Constitution are beholden to the limitations imposed by the First
Amendment.234 Consider the one congressional power that is
specifically mentioned in Articles I and III: the power to create
courts inferior to the Supreme Court, which is referenced both
in Article I, Section 8,235 and in Article III, Section 1.236 Surely
a subsequent constitutional amendment mandating (or prohibiting) the existence of “courts inferior to the Supreme Court”
would “amend” congressional power under Article I as well as
under Article III.
Just as a shared focus on congressional power creates a tie
between Article I and the Exceptions Clause, the First
Amendment and the Exceptions Clause are tied together by
language as well as logic. Amar’s intertextualist framework—
which Part I.D argued is a powerful tool for unraveling the
meaning of amendments—reveals a clear textual interlock between the words “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make”237 and the phrase “Congress shall make no law.”238 Since exceptions and regulations
cannot come about except by law (i.e., congressional action), the
Amendment seems to target congressional alteration of jurisdiction just as clearly as it targets, for example, congressional
funding measures.239 Moreover, this reading vindicates the intent of the Amendment’s drafters because it protects courts’
power to give meaning to the Bill of Rights, assuaging AntiFederalist concerns about an overreaching Congress.240
234. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 9 (“The Congress shall have Power . . .
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court . . . .”).
236. Id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”).
237. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
238. Id. amend. I.
239. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (noting that the
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause means that “[n]o tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion”).
240. See supra note 94; see also Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General
Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1133 (1988)
(“What united the representatives of all the states, both in Congress and in
the ratifying legislatures, was a much more narrow purpose: to make it plain
that Congress was not to legislate on the subject of religion, thereby leaving
the matter of church-state relations to the individual states.” (footnote omitted)).
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The First Amendment thus alters congressional power under the Exceptions Clause just as it does congressional power
under Article I. Because of this, Congress may not, for example,
pass a jurisdiction-stripping law impermissibly “respecting an
establishment of religion,” nor one “abridging the freedom of
speech.”241 In other words, Congress has no more (or less) power to favor religion or to limit speech through regulation of federal jurisdiction than it does by controlling the power of the
purse: the First Amendment provides an external constraint on
the Exceptions Clause. This conclusion does not, of course, absolve courts of determining what kinds of jurisdiction-stripping
laws are constitutional. Two examples illustrate the point.
The Public Prayer Protection Act of 2005 was proposed as
part of a raft of congressional legislation intended to protect religious practice242—specifically, in the case of the Act, “the right
of elected and appointed officials to express their religious beliefs through public prayer.”243 Declaring that “the exercise of
this right does not violate the Establishment Clause,”244 the Act
noted that “Article II, Section 2, clause 2 of the United States
Constitution [the Exceptions Clause] expressly grants Congress
the authority to define the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal
court system.”245 Invoking this power, the Act provided:
“[T]he Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal,
writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any matter that relates to the alleged
establishment of religion involving an entity of the Federal Government or a State or local government, or an officer or agent of the Federal Government or a State or local government, acting in an official
capacity, concerning the expression of public prayer by that entity, officer, or agent.”246

Similarly, the Pledge Protection Act247 was proposed in the
wake of a well-publicized Ninth Circuit decision holding that a
“school district’s policy and practice of teacher-led recitation of
the Pledge, with the inclusion of the added words ‘under God,’
violates the Establishment Clause.”248 Section 2 of the Act
reads in part as follows:
241. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
242. Diana B. Henriques, In the Congressional Hopper: A Long Wish List of
Special Benefits and Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at A20.
243. H.R. 4364, 109th Cong. (2005).
244. Id. § 2, cl. 3.
245. Id. § 2, cl. 5.
246. Id. § 3.
247. H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004); see also H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (2005).
248. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub
nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and
the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity
under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance . . . or its recitation.249

Although the Act does not contain language describing its
purpose, its supporters made it clear that it was intended to
prevent the Supreme Court from striking down the Pledge on
First Amendment grounds. Representative Todd Akin said,
Essentially what our bill does, if you want to put it in a simple word
picture, we are creating a fence. The fence goes around the Federal
judiciary. We do that because we don’t trust them. We don’t trust
them because of previous decisions and because of the simple fact that
there are not five votes on the Supreme Court to protect our beloved
Pledge of Allegiance.250

Representative Tom DeLay added, “I think that [it] would
be a very good idea to send a message to the judiciary they
ought to keep their hands off the Pledge of Allegiance.”251 As
their names and the statements of their supporters indicate,
both “Protection Acts” were passed in anticipation of court decisions striking down certain forms of public worship. Rather
than amending the Constitution to say that various forms of
prayer are constitutional, the Acts would have prevented federal courts from ruling that they are not.
Although these jurisdiction-stripping Acts attempt to limit
First Amendment challenges to public prayer, they are themselves legislative acts of Congress subject to the First Amendment. As such, they must not impermissibly “respect[] an establishment of religion” or “abridg[e] the freedom of speech.”252
And in analyzing whether these or any other jurisdictionstripping laws violate the First Amendment, courts could simp249. H.R. 2028, § 2(a).
250. 152 CONG. REC. H5415 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Akin).
251. Stephen Dinan, DeLay Threatens to Curb Courts’ Jurisdiction; Vents
Ire over Pledge of Allegiance, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A04.
252. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause is a particularly useful example because religiously themed jurisdiction-stripping proposals are
among the most common Congress has considered and proposed. In addition to
the examples discussed here, see Religious Liberties Restoration Act, S. 1558,
108th Cong. (2003) (limiting jurisdiction of federal courts over cases involving
the Pledge of Allegiance, display of the Ten Commandments, and invocation of
“In God We Trust”), Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th
Cong. § 1 (2005) (stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to determine the
constitutionality of government official’s “acknowledgement of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government”), and Constitution Restoration
Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005) (same).
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ly import existing First Amendment doctrine. Thus, to be valid,
a law stripping jurisdiction over Establishment Clause claims
should be required to meet the three-pronged test set out in
Lemon v. Kurtzman253: it must advance a secular purpose, must
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion,
and must not result in an excessive entanglement of government and religion.254 If a court finds that an act stripping jurisdiction over Establishment Clause claims fails any of the three
prongs, it is unconstitutional and invalid.
Under the Lemon test, both the Public Prayer Protection
Act and Pledge Protection Act are of questionable validity.
Whether the Acts have a legitimate secular purpose under the
first prong is debatable. Their supporters might say (in the face
of the legislative history and in the absence of factual support)
that the Acts were passed to clear federal courts’ crowded dockets of Establishment Clause challenges to public prayer, or
simply to make state courts the primary enforcers of the First
Amendment in this area.255 On the other hand, the public
statements of the Acts’ supporters suggest that the main, if not
singular, purpose of the Acts is not strictly secular, but rather
an attempt to protect public religious acts from federal court
review.256
Thus both Acts would at least raise questions under the
first prong of Lemon. They are on somewhat stronger footing
with regard to the second and third prongs. Although the Acts
would certainly have the effect of advancing religion—that, after all, is what their supporters designed them to do—it is
doubtful that this effect would be “primary” and thus violative
of Lemon’s second prong.257 Similarly, both Acts encourage
some degree of “entanglement” of government and religion,
since they would limit First Amendment challenges to prayers
made either by public officials or in public schools. But it is unclear whether the entanglement that would result from barring

253. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
254. Id. at 612–13.
255. Many thanks to William Van Alstyne for bringing this point—among
many others—to my attention. Of course he bears no blame for any shortcomings in my attempt to address them.
256. See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text.
257. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125–26 (1982) (asserting that a statute giving churches and schools the power to effectively veto
liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius had a “‘primary’ and ‘principal’ effect of
advancing religion”).
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such constitutional claims from federal courts would be “excessive” enough to violate Lemon’s third prong.258
The Public Prayer Protection Act and Pledge Protection Act
would thus possibly fail one, and perhaps all three, of the Lemon test’s prongs. A defender of the Acts might answer that any
argument against their constitutionality presupposes that public prayer, or the “under God” language in the Pledge, violates
the Establishment Clause. If they do not violate the First
Amendment, then a jurisdiction-stripping provision preventing
courts from finding that they do cannot itself violate the Establishment Clause. But this attempted defense of the Act puts the
Establishment Clause cart before the jurisdictional horse. Determining whether the Pledge violates the Establishment
Clause in a challenge to a jurisdiction-stripping act would be
the equivalent of a court asserting jurisdiction to determine
whether it had jurisdiction, a power that courts always possess.259 If the Pledge passes the Lemon test, then so does the
act. If it does not, then neither does the act. In this sense, both
Acts have an Escher-esque quality: they attempt to strip federal jurisdiction over Establishment Clause challenges, and yet
they appear themselves to violate that Clause.
D. CAVEATS AND OTHER AMENDMENTS
Drawing together Part I’s discussion of the impact of
amendments and Part II’s discussion of the Exceptions Clause,
the previous Section argued that the First Amendment imposes
the same limitations on Congress’s use of its power under the
Exceptions Clause as it does on all other exercises of congressional power. This thickened understanding of the Exceptions
Clause’s relationship to the rest of the Constitution provides
much-needed support to the external constraints theory embraced by many federal courts scholars. But just as those scholars have generally not yet marshaled all of the support for
their position, neither have they considered all of its weaknesses. This Section identifies some of those objections and limitations on the application of an external constraints theory.

258. Id. at 127 (“The challenged statute thus enmeshes churches in the
processes of government . . . . Ordinary human experience and a long line of
cases teach that few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of the
Constitution.” (citation omitted)).
259. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266,
274 (1926) (Brandeis, J.) (“Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the conditions essential to its exercise exist.”).
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One potential objection to the theory of an amended Exceptions Clause is that subsequent amendments, rather than
“amending” the Exceptions Clause, amend the first sentence of
Article III, Section 2. That sentence reads: “The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . . .”260 That
entire phrase, in turn, has been read as being modified by the
final sentence of the second paragraph, the Exceptions Clause:
“with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”261 If a subsequent amendment were to work
a change on Article III, one might ask why that change should
be to the Exceptions Clause (thus limiting Congress’s power
over federal jurisdiction) as opposed to the first phrase of Article III (thus expanding the range of cases over which the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction). Under this amendments-as-additions reading, federal courts would have
jurisdiction over cases arising under the new amendment, but
that jurisdiction would remain subject to Congress’s unchanged
Exceptions Clause power.
Another version of the same argument might say that if an
amendment’s drafters meant to alter the Exceptions Clause,
the text of the amendment would make that intention clear.
Such arguments have been advanced against the internal constraints theory of the Exceptions Clause262 and could reasonably be made against the modified external constraints theory
presented in this Article. Continuing to use the First Amendment as an example, an opponent of the theory treating
amendments as limitations on Congress’s Exceptions Clause
power could argue that since the text of the First Amendment
does not mention the Clause, its impact on the Clause is ambiguous. Thus, the more sensible reading would be to simply consider the Amendment as an addition to the Constitution, subject to the Clause.
But as applied to the text of amendments, these lack-ofspecificity arguments prove too much. As explained in Part I,
constitutional amendments rarely identify the text they mean
to alter, but courts and scholars nonetheless interpret their impact broadly.263 The First Amendment, for example, limits governmental actors besides the national legislature, even though
260.
261.
262.
263.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
Handman, supra note 28, at 207.
See supra notes 111–14.
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Congress is the only entity it specifically mentions.264 It would
be strange indeed if courts required an amendment to contain a
more specific statement of intent to amend the Exceptions
Clause, especially since courts considering jurisdictionstripping legislation have often required Congress to provide
specific statements of its intent to strip jurisdiction.265 It seems
unlikely that the Clause should be given a broad, relatively
“unamendable” reading when the powers exercised under the
Clause must be specific, and are construed narrowly.
Thus far, this Part has focused on the relationship between
the Exceptions Clause and the First Amendment. But other
amendments might prove to be even more fertile grounds for
finding “amendments” to the Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment is an obvious candidate and has been a favorite reference
point for external constraints theorists.266 This Article has purposefully avoided using the Fourteenth Amendment as a point
of departure, partially in an attempt to set aside for now the
complications of the incorporation debate. That debate—
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of
Rights as against the states—is perhaps the most recognizable
of the impact-of-amendment discussions laid out in Part I.267 If
anything, however, the resolution of the incorporation debate—
to the degree that there has been one—supports the general
thesis that amendments have impacts on the existing Constitution (including its earlier amendments).
Perhaps more importantly for the thesis that amendments
can limit Congress’s Exceptions Clause power, the Fourteenth
Amendment was, unlike the First Amendment, fundamentally
an expansion of congressional power.268 Relying on the Four264. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) (per curiam) (holding that courts had no power to grant the executive’s
request for an injunction to prevent the New York Times and the Washington
Post from publishing a classified study regarding U.S. policy in Vietnam); id.
at 718–19 (Black, J., concurring) (finding that the First Amendment limits the
President’s power to create judicially enforceable prior restraints on the publication of newspaper articles); Strauss, supra note 44, at 907.
265. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S.
85, 104–05 (1869) (noting that the jurisdiction-stripping statute of 1867 contained “no repealing words” and stating that “[r]epeals by implication are not
favored”).
266. See Katyal, supra note 35, at 1367.
267. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 460 (describing the incorporation debate as “[p]erhaps the most famous modern synthetic
problem”).
268. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“Correctly viewed,
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teenth Amendment to restrict congressional power, when the
text of the Amendment so clearly aims to expand it, requires a
deeper and closer reading than “external constraints” theorists
have thus far given it, or than this Article can provide.269 External constraints theorists who rely on the Fourteenth
Amendment must measure its broad, general language against
the explicit, clear language of the Exceptions Clause.270 As a result, they are susceptible to arguments that the clear language
of the Exceptions Clause must trump penumbras or emanations from elsewhere.271 The First Amendment, by contrast, is
both specific—in that it is directed at Congress—and, unlike
the Fourteenth Amendment, clearly restricts the government’s
power. This does not mean that Congress’s Exceptions Clause
power is not subject to due process or equal protection limitations; it suggests only that describing these limitations demands more attention than scholars have devoted to it.
Finally, it should be noted that the argument regarding
constitutional amendment presented in Part I of this Article is
fundamentally one about the U.S. Constitution, not state constitutions or other constitutive documents.272 State constitu§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
269. Interestingly enough, Chief Justice John Roberts, then a Special Assistant to the Attorney General, noted in a memorandum about congressional
control over federal jurisdiction that “Congress may derive additional authority in regulating Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over Fourteenth
Amendment cases by virtue of §5 of that Amendment.” Memorandum from
John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen., Proposals to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction: An Analysis in Light of Recent Developments 25 (n.d.), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/
accession-60-89-0172/006-Box5-Folder1522.pdf [hereinafter Roberts, Memorandum] (emphasis added).
270. Redish, supra note 29, at 907–08; Rice, supra note 182, at 975 (“[T]he
exceptions clause is clear, unambiguous, and unqualified.”).
271. See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical View and New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 72 (1975) (“[T]he language and history of article
III are so clear that any alteration, even to accomplish the framers’ purposes,
must come by amendment and not by interpretation in light of ‘changing circumstances.’”). During a congressional debate on the issue, Senator Sam Ervin
noted, “I don’t believe that the Founding Fathers could have found any simpler
words or plainer words in the English language to say what they said, which
was that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is dependent entirely
upon the will of Congress.” Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 22 (1968) (statement of
Sen. Ervin).
272. For an international approach, see Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Suns-
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tions vary in their amendment procedures, but many make
amendment a much less difficult—and much less radical—
proposition than the U.S. Constitution does. Donald Lutz’s interesting comparative study of federal and state constitutional
amendment reports that state constitutions are amended at
nearly ten times the rate of the U.S. Constitution.273 The Alabama constitution, to take the most striking example, was
amended 726 times between 1901 and 1991.274 Statutes, too,
generally present a distinct model of amendment; one which
differs from both the state constitution model and the Federal
Constitution model described here. Unlike their constitutional
cousins, statutes are often amended through a specific process
of strike-outs that specifically identify the sections or parts of
the statute to be replaced. There are structural (not to mention
practical) problems preventing courts from applying a nuanced
reading to the “amendment” of statutes and state constitutions,
many of which contain hundreds or thousands of provisions
enacted at hundreds or thousands of different times.275 But the
U.S. Constitution, the interpretation of whose minutiae has occupied courts and scholars for hundreds of years, not only allows for such a close reading, but demands it.
E. EXPLICITLY AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
The theory of constitutional amendment described in Part I
of this Article requires interpreters to consider whether, even
in the absence of a specific reference to a target provision, an
amendment changes the text of the “Original Constitution.”276
tein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 275, 275 (“The procedure for constitutional modification best adapted to Eastern Europe today sets relatively lax conditions for amendment, keeps unamendable provisions to a minimal core of basic
rights and institutions, and usually allows the process to be monopolized by
parliament, without any obligatory recourse to popular referenda.”).
273. Lutz, supra note 51, at 247.
274. Id. at 248.
275. See Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573,
580 (1915) (“Not only are [state constitutions] subject to constant change, but
they have long since ceased to be constitutions in a true sense. . . . No one now
entertains any particular respect for a state constitution. It has little more
dignity than an ordinary act of the legislature.”); Tribe, supra note 18, at 442
n.42 (“The cluttered and rapidly changing contents of state constitutions may
partially explain why even the most enduring and fundamental provisions of
these documents rarely command the respect routinely paid to federal constitutional guarantees.” (citing Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1353–56 (1982))).
276. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X pmbl.
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Part II.C argued that the First Amendment may have implicitly amended the Exceptions Clause, thus limiting Congress’s
power over federal jurisdiction. But the caveats described in the
previous Section are themselves weighty, and their resolution
remains unclear. If anything, the preceding discussion has illustrated not just the possibilities, but the pitfalls of a constitutional analysis that relies on implicit amendment of the Exceptions Clause.
The better solution for proponents of a vulnerable amendment—that is, one ratified by a temporary supermajority but
potentially subject to a jurisdiction-stripping bill passed by a
subsequent simple majority—is to insulate it from jurisdictionstripping legislation by guaranteeing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over cases arising under the amendment.277 An
amendment could, for example, include a provision stating,
“The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all
cases arising under this amendment, notwithstanding Congress’s power to make exceptions and regulations to that jurisdiction.” Another alternative more in line with the “Congress
shall have power to enforce” language found in other amendments278 is, “The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under this amendment.” Such a provision would implicitly but clearly amend Article III, preserving
Congress’s power to remove lower federal courts’ jurisdiction
over the amendment while protecting the Supreme Court’s final, appellate review.
While future amendments may include language guaranteeing Supreme Court review of cases arising under their
terms, none of the twenty-seven amendments currently appended to the U.S. Constitution say anything about jurisdiction
or courts’ responsibility for enforcing them.279 Some of the
amendments—especially the Fifth and the Sixth—are clearly
277. See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 153, at 21–22 (arguing that supporters of amendments should attempt “to think through and
articulate the consequences of their proposal, including the ways in which the
amendment would interact with other constitutional provisions and principles”).
278. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend.
XV, § 2.
279. In a 1963 Yale Law Journal piece, Charles Black excoriated a thenpending amendment which would have directly altered Article V, replacing its
current text with new language essentially eliminating Congress’s role in the
amendment process. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note
52; Black, A Letter to a Congressman, supra note 52. The proposed amendment
soon died.
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directed at courts, and indeed Madison originally proposed that
those two amendments be interwoven with the text of Article
III.280 But even so, the amendments by their terms say nothing
about federal courts’ duty to enforce them.
This deafening silence regarding judicial power contrasts
with the increasingly loud expansions of congressional power in
constitutional amendments passed since the Civil War.281 To
take just three examples, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments all identically provide that “Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”282
Similar phrases adorn most of the amendments passed since
the Civil War era,283 most notably Section 5 of the Fourteenth.284 These Amendments are grants of congressional power, not limitations on it.
Looking back on the amendment process described in Part
I, the legislative power-expanding nature of these amendments
may be unsurprising, given Congress’s powerful role in the
amendment process.285 Indeed, the very structure of Article V
seems to create momentum for this legislative-empowering
trend in constitutional amendment. After all, every constitutional amendment has originated as a congressional proposal.286 The simple political reality may be that Congress is unlikely to add a provision limiting its institutional power to
control the fate of an amendment it has proposed.
The greatest counterexample to this reading of amendments as legislature-empowering is the Bill of Rights.287 But
while many of the first ten amendments expressly limit congressional power, they also represent something of a special
case, having been passed in part to assuage Anti-Federalist

280. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
281. KYVIG, supra note 84, at 154–55.
282. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XV, XIX.
283. See, e.g., id. amends. XIV, XV, XVIII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI.
284. Id. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
285. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 976 (1993) (“For Congress at least, the legislative
role in proposing constitutional amendments often was seen as a special subset of the general legislative duty to interpret the Constitution.”).
286. The Twenty-first Amendment, ending Prohibition, was ratified by
state conventions, but it was proposed by Congress. See Everett S. Brown, The
Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, 29 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1005,
1005–17 (1935).
287. See Amar, supra note 133.
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concerns about the power of the federal government.288 The
Eleventh Amendment, which followed in short order, also effectively limited federal power.289 Moreover, on the eve of the Civil
War, Congress proposed an amendment that would have limited federal power by altering Article V itself. The proposal—
known as the Corwin Amendment—provided that “[n]o
amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere,
within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said
State.”290 Lincoln endorsed the Amendment (which ironically
would have been the thirteenth) and three Union-side states
ratified it before the Civil War broke out and the legislators
scrapped the effort.291 Thus, prior to the Civil War, there was a
clear pattern of passing amendments that limited congressional
power.
In contrast, the clear trend since the Civil War has been for
amendments to expand the legislature’s power. A constitutional
amendment lessening Congress’s power under the Exceptions
Clause may thus have to overcome a fair bit of institutional
momentum, but it is not an impossibility. In addition to proposing the Bill of Rights, Congress has occasionally pronounced its
fidelity to the ideal of an independent judiciary,292 and individ288. Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifty-Seventh Cleveland-Marshall Lecture: “The
Bill of Rights and Our Posterity,” 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 575 (1994)
(“Though proposed by the Federalist Madison, the original Bill of Rights reflects its Anti-Federalist parentage as well.”); William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 782, 843 n.308 (1995) (“The movement to secure a bill of rights
came from Anti-federalists who wanted to limit the national government’s
power.”); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1699, 1705 (1991) (“The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to incorporate these
Anti-Federalist protections into the predominantly Federalist document.”).
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (limiting federal jurisdiction in cases where
states are parties).
290. See Mark E. Brandon, The “Original” Thirteenth Amendment and the
Limits to Formal Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION,
supra note 51, at 215, 216–20.
291. Id. at 219.
292. Following its rejection of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary declared,
Let us now set a salutatory precedent that will never be violated. Let
us, of the Seventy-fifth Congress, in words that will never be disregarded by any succeeding Congress, declare that we would rather
have an independent Court, a fearless Court, a Court that will dare to
announce its honest opinions in what it believes to be the defense of
liberties of the people, than a Court that, out of fear or sense of obli-
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ual legislators have sometimes willingly foregone politically
appealing jurisdiction-stripping measures for such principled
reasons as the importance of an independent judiciary.293 While
these attitudes may indicate that an amendment explicitly limiting congressional power under the Exceptions Clause is not
impossible, no constitutional amendment has specifically
amended the Exceptions Clause. Further, few scholars or legislators seem to have given much thought to the potential for
amendments to limit Exceptions Clause power.294 But in light
of Congress’s increasing flirtation with jurisdiction-stripping
legislation, the possibility can no longer be ignored.
CONCLUSION
Bruce Ackerman recently noted that “[a] funny thing happened to Americans on the way to the twenty-first century. We
have lost our ability to write down our new constitutional
commitments in the old-fashioned way.”295 But perhaps what
has really happened is that Congress has abandoned Article V
as a method of recording those commitments and has instead

gation to the appointing power, or factional passion, approves any
measure we may enact. We are not the judges of the judges. We are
not above the Constitution.
S. REP. NO. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1937).
293. 128 CONG. REC. 2242 (statement of Sen. Goldwater) (expanding on his
“concern about proposals that would interfere with Federal court independence”).
294. The one counterexample I have found is a proposal, supported by former Justice Owen Roberts, to excise the Exceptions Clause entirely. Owen J.
Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court’s Independence, 35
A.B.A. J. 1 (1949). The year after Hart’s influential article was published,
Senator Butler proposed just such an amendment, a revision he claimed was
necessary to protect the Court from congressional interference. See S.J. Res.
44, 83d Cong. (1954); 99 CONG. REC. 1106–07 (1954) (statement of Sen. Butler); see also S. REP. NO. 83-1091, at 2 (1954) (“The purpose of this joint resolution . . . is to fortify the independence of the judiciary by amendments to the
Constitution, thereby forestalling efforts by any future President or Congress
seeking to nullify or impair the power of the judicial branch of government.”).
Although the Senate passed the bill, and the American Bar Association supported it, the House tabled the initiative. Roberts, Memorandum, supra note
269, at 21.
Illustrating the political volatility of the constitutional issues described
here, Senator Butler also spearheaded an effort three years later to strip the
Court’s power over congressional attempts to target “subversive activities.”
Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to
Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003, 1042 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Ackerman, The Living Constitution, supra note 79, at 1741.
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employed its power under the Exceptions Clause to pass jurisdiction-stripping legislation. As the latter increasingly replaces
the former as the preferred method of adjusting courts’ treatment of constitutional questions, the relationship between the
two demands increasing attention.
Unfortunately, scholars of constitutional amendment and
of federal jurisdiction have too often wandered in different
parts of the same forest, lost in the difficult problems presented
by their respective obsessions and failing to appreciate the insights they have to offer each other. This Article describes a
path between them. Perhaps a better understanding of
amendments’ unique status as external constraints will make it
easier to find limits on the Exceptions Clause. And perhaps a
theory more tied to the text of the Constitution will give the
Supreme Court stronger footing from which to begin outlining
the limits on Congress’s power over federal-court jurisdiction.

